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I am still waiting for the record in this case.

I doubt

that it will help very much in arguing that the Lockett point was
argued below, in substance, although not by

name. ~

I have enclosed xeroxes of the relevant portions of the
opinions by the county court and the court of criminal appeals.
I think you are going to run into the following arguments at
conference:

1.

It may be argued that although the trial court did

not, the appeal court did consider the full range of mitigating
circumstances.

It found that Eddings' emotional disturbance and

family background did not "excuse" what he did.

If one believes

that the appeal court did consider the full range of mitigating
circumstances then one would either be inclined not to remand on
Lockett at all or one might argue that the matter should be
remanded to the sentencing judge for him to consider the full
range of mitigating circumstances. This second approach raises
the question you and I discussed earlier in the term as to
whether review by a state appeal court can cure error by the
sentencer.

The Court's current position is that such review does

cure error, and I don't think that the Court can remand to the
trial court without changing this position.

*I
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2.

More plausible to me, is that the state appeal

court did not consider the full range of mitigating
circumstances.

When you read the full paragraph, it appears that

the appellate court confused legal excuses from culpability with
circumstances mitigating the sentence.

The court emphasizes that

Eddings knew right from wrong and that "explanations" were not
"excuses." At least if the paragraph may be read this way--if
there is ambiguity--a remand would be appropriate.

3.

There will be some question as to whether the Court

can consider the Lockett point when the question was not argued
to the courts below and was not even argued in the cert petition.
It appears that in Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414

u.s.

478 (1974),

the Court did consider a plain error that had not been argued in
the court below nor in the jurisdictional statement.
Perhaps it can be argued that although Lockett was not
specifically argued to the lower courts, the question of what
range of mitigating circumstances must be considered was very
much on the minds of both the trial court and the court of
criminal appeals.

Both courts appeared to rule that personality

disorders and family background do not qualify as mitigating
circumstances.

In this sense, although Lockett was not argued by

name, the courts have issued judgments on the question of whether
family background and emotional disorders must be considered
mitigating circumstances.
consider the same question.

I think it fair for the Court to

9

1n.l( {o(.,(Vlt~ (vv.rT ~u-~ ~?..r
iyen very serious consideration to the youth of the Deferwant when this particular crime was committed. Should
I fail to do this, I think I would not be carrying out my
duty~·· On -the ~ ot{lexJ'land,_t]1El_,Qourt cannot be persuaded
entirely by the youthfulness of the fact that the youtri was
sixteen years old when this heineous crime was committed.
- Nor can the Court in following the law, in my opinion, consider th~ fact of this young man's vwlent background. I ant
very cognizant of the ac
a e teads to this CtHir-t for
mercy instead of murder-or to be killed himself. Under
the law, I do.•not fi~(C£haf'theyotithful fn'-this· particular
case offsets the condition of mitigation-or in any way softens the act that was committed.
....:::-80-Il&t-finfl.ing any mitigation other than the youthfulness, and failing to finCI)hat It has ·sufficiently softened the
- aggtavat:mg circumstances that the Court has found beyond
a reasonable doubt, the Court has no alternative [290] in
this particular case other than to sentence Monty Lee
Eddings to death. And this will be the judgment and finding of this Court.
And Mr. Eddings, if you will come up with your attorney, I will indicate to you what time this execution will be
carried out.
Mr. Eddings, in carrying out the finding by this Court, as
I understand the law to be, the sentencing shall be carried
out no less than sixty or more than ninety days from the execution date that has been found by the Court. And in this
particular case, the Court will order execution carried out
on you for this merciless killing of Trooper Crabtree sixty
days from today's date, which would be-this is the 17th of
May, I will make it a few days longer than sixty to get beyond any minimum-it would be July the 20th, 1978, at
12:00 noon. This will be carried out under the auspices of
the Department of Corrections in the manner required by
Oklahoma Statutes, which I understand at this time to be
death to be administered by drugs. And the Department of
Corrections is ordered to carry out this particular execution
absent any stay that I receive, or they receive.
Now at this time, Mr. Eddings, it is the duty of the

)
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sive experience in the field of criminal law. He also diagnosed the petitioner as an anti-social personality, and he
talked about the factors in the petitioner's life which had
led to this development. He believed that the petitioner
could be helped ~.th_the:t:apy_tQ_ work through his problems
and take a useful place in societ~iven a sufficient length
of time. __ - - ~
The diagnosis of an anti-social disorder was repeated by
the psychiatrist in private practice. This doctor, too, believed the petitioner could be treated, but estimated it
would take 15 to 20 years of intensive therapy (although he
had said three years at the certification hearing). He believed that at the time the petitioner- pulled- the...irigg.eL.he
was disassociating: in his opinion th~ - p~r_w_a_§_llot
~ahoma Highway PafD)l _O mcer,_b_ut was killing the specter of hl~- stepfather:..who was a po-liCeman in
Missouri. Nevertheless, the doctor thouglifl:.~titioner
knew- t}1e difference between right and wrong-the petitioner just- did not- think the rulesapplied- to him. On the
other hand, the doctor did not believe the petitioner would
kill again if the opportunity ever arose.
In-fiis cYoSi~argument to the District Court and in his
brief and argument to this Court, the petitioner's attorney
urged several mitigating circumstances. However, the trial
court found only one-the petitioner's youth. As stated
e~rlier, the .District Court indicated great weig~t had been
giVen to th1s factor but, nevertheless, found 1t could not
overbalance the aggravating circumstances of the case. We,
too, have given serious consideration to the petitioner's
youth. But the aggravating circumstances in this case are
very serious; and we, too, have to conclude that the petitioner's youth cannot outweigh them.
v The petitioner also argu~is_rn_ental state at the time o
tfi~murfu:_r. He stresses his £-mi!y~ing ne was
---suffering from severe psyc ological and emoti~i8orders,--an-dL"hat-t-he---kilting-wa~ctuali~-- 'table
proauct or-the- way-rrewasralSed. Ther~_js Jlo...doubt __that
the petitioner-has a-personali£f]lisoiaer. But all the evi.. dence -tends- t-o-show-that-heK"fl"ew the diffe~

-------

1

)

)
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This conviction wherein the death penalty was assessed
places this Court in the same position that confronted the
Supreme Court of South Carolina in State v. Shaw, 255
S.E.2d 799, 807 (S.C.1979), wherein that Court stated:
"We have compared the death sentences imposed upon
appellants with the sentences imposed in all prior capital cases tried under the current death penalty statutes and are satisfied that there are no similar cases
against which the proportionality of the sentences
imposed upon appellants can be measured.
"The inability of this Court to compare this case with
any other similar cases does not require, however,
that appellants' sentences be set aside. Any system of
review that requires a comparison of each case with all
similar prior cases must have a beginning. There will
be a first case for each type or category of capital case
that may appear and that first case necessarily cannot
be compared to any other similar cases. The first case
must stand alone, otherwise comparative sentence review would be forever impossible." (Footnote omitted)
An attempt has been made to compare this case with
prior cases that were tried and reviewed under death penalty statutes that are definitionally different from the current statutes. Hence, we find those cases provide no basis
for meaningful sentence review. 4
The current death penalty statutes comply with the
guidelines ·set out in Gregg. We have considered and overruled each assignment of error by the petitioner and have
completed the statutorily mandated sentence review. We

4
A list of cases with an attempt to compare is: Manuel v. State,
Okl.Cr., 560 P.2d 1008 (1977); Clark v. State, Oki.Cr., 558 P.2d 674
(1977); Strange v. State, Oki.Cr., 462 P.2d 292 (1969); Fesmire v.
State, Oki.Cr., 456 P.2d 573 (1969); French v. State, Oki.Cr., 416 P.2d
171 (1966); Dare v. State, Oki.Cr., 378 P.2d 339 (1963); Doggett v.
State, Oki.Cr., 371 P.2d 523 (1962); Young v. State, Oki.Cr., 357 P.2d
562 (1960); Spence v . State, Oki.Cr., 353 P.2d 1114 (1960); Williams v.
State, Oki.Cr., 321 P.2d 990 (1958); Williams v. Oklahoma, affd 358
U.S. 576, 79 S.Ct. 421, 3 L.Ed.2d 516; rehearing denied, 359 U.S. 956,
79 S.Ct. 737, 3 L.Ed.2d 763 (1959); Klettke v. State, 92 Okl.Cr. 366,
223 P.2d 787 (1950).
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CHAM BE RS OF

T HE CHIEF .JUSTICE

November 16, 1981

Re:

No. 80-5727 - Eddings v. Oklahoma

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONfERENCE:
I will take on a dissent in the above.
Regards,

dfl 11/16/81

Draft:

No. 80-5727, Eddings v. Oklahoma

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner

was

convicted of

first degree murder and sentenced to death.

Because this

sentence was

Monty

Lee Eddings

imposed without "the type of individualized

consideration of mitigating
Eighth

and

Fourteenth

Lockett v. Ohio,
we reverse.

438

factors

Amendments

u.s.

586,

606

required
in

capital

by

the

cases,"

(1978) (Burger, C.J.),

2.

I

On April 4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth,
and

several

younger

Missouri homes.

companions

drivingA without
"

away

from

'

southwesterly direction.

trl-4t..,. •.:, ~J.....,... '1

destination

or

~tfS
Art~ei
tsA-e

~ 9~

purpose

~96>1:

~

Ee~H·fl~s ~ momentarily

lost

control

of

the

car,

in

a

~~·-~~~

~ .Hwt- ~ If- ~~-,..WJ .r.........l,. - ~
/\ several rifles i:ddil"l'9'S .Jhad taken from his father.

I-..,

their

They travelled in a car owned by Eddings'

~ ~ J'IA,. ~
brother,

ran

After
he

was

signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma
Highway

Patrol.

Eddings

did

so,

and

when

the Officer

approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of
the window and fired, killing the Officer.
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved
to have him certified to stand trial as an adult.

Finding

-that there was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that
Eddings

was

not

amenable

to

rehabilitation

within

the

juvenile system, the trial court granted the motion. The
ruling was affirmed on appeal.
1340

Matter of M.E., 584 P.2d

(Okl. Cr. 1978), cert denied,

436 U.S.

921

(1978).

Eddings was then charged with murder in the first degree,

3•

.

.

and the District Court of Creek County found

him guilty

upon his plea of nolo contendere.
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in
pertinent part:
"Upon conviction ••• of guilt of a defendant of
murder in the first degree, the court shall
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine
whether
the
defendant
should
be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment • • . . In
the
sentencing proceeding,
evidence may be
presented as to any mitigating circumstances or
as to any of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in this act." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
21, § 701.10 (emphasis added).

Section

lists

701.12

circumstances;

seven

separate

aggravating

the statute nowhere defines what is meant

by "any mitigating circumstances."
At

the

sentencing

hearing,

the

State

alleged

three of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in the

statute~~e ~~-•~ed th~ murder
~

was especially

heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that the crime was committed
for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest,
and that there was a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §
701.12(4),

(5), & (7).

4.

~~~

In mitigation, Eddings presented evidence at the
<\

hearing

of

his

troubled

youth.

supervising Juvenile Officer
been

raised

without

divorced

when

Eddings

lived

supervision.

he

with

that

guidance.

five,
his

testimony

indicated

proper

was

The

and

His

until

mother

of

his

Eddings

had

parents

he

was

without

any

were

fourteen
rules

or

There is the suggestion that Eddings' mother

was an alcoholic and possibly a prostitute. Appx. at 110.
By the

time Eddings was

controlled,
father.

and

But

neither

to

reason

Attempts

punishment.
was

his

mother

sent

could
and

and

bitter,

he

~

him

to

the

father

talk

gave

The Juvenile Officer

~/,_~
s..c&red

fourteen

that

his

no

live

longer~ be
with

his

control

the

way

physical

to

boy.

testified that Eddings
father

overreacted

and

-\

used

excessive

physical

punishment:

"Mr.

Eddings

found

the only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy
was actual punishment, or physical violence--hitting with
a strap or something like this." Appx. at 121.
Testimony

from

other

witnesses

indicated

that

Eddings was seriously emotionally disturbed in general and
at

the

time

of

the

crime,

and

that

his

mental

and

5.

emotional dev.elopment were at a level several years below
his age. Appx. at 173.

A State psychologist stated that

Eddings had a sociopathic or anti-social personality and
that 30% of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out
of

it

as

they

aged.

A

sociologist

specializing

in

juvenile offenders testified that Eddings was treatable.
A

psychiatrist

testified

that

Eddings

could

be

rehabilitated by intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year
period.

He

testified

further

that

Eddings

was

disassociating at the time of the murder, and that "he did
pull the trigger, he did kill someone, but I don't even
think he

knew

that he was doing it." 1 The psychiatrist

suggested that, if treated, Eddings would no longer pose a
threat to society.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial
judge weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating

1 The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of
the murder, Eddings was in his own mind shooting his
stepfather--a policeman who had been married to his mother
for
a
brief period when Eddings was seven.
The
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances
and the facts of his life, and the facts of his arrested
development, he acted as a seven year old seeking revenge
and rebellion: and the act--he did pull the trigger, he
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he
was doing it." Appx. 172.

6.

circumstances.
the

three

He found that the State had proved each of

alleged

aggravating

reasonable doubt. 2

circumstances

factor

a

Turning to the evidence of mitigating

circumstances, the judge found that Eddings'
mitigating

beyond

of

great

weight:

"I

have

youth was a
given

very

serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when
this particular crime was commmitted.
this,

I

think I

Should I fail to do

would not be carrying out my duty."

But

c:.c..,. u~ ._1:;..... < ~ .......
he

would

Eddings'

not

consider

in

mitigation

~

the

~

evide~ee

unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance:

of
II

... the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the .•. fact
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heineous CstL]
crime was committed.

Nor can the Court in following the

law, in my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's
violent background."

~2 The

(emphasis added).

Finding that the

trial judge found first that the crime was
atrocious, and cruel" because "designed to
inflict a Righ degree of pain •.. in utter indifference to
the rights of Patrolman Crabtree."
Second, the judge
found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution."
The evidence was sufficient to indicate that at the time
of the offense Eddings did not wish to be returned to
Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's intent
was to make a lawful arrest.
Finally, based on two
threatening statements made by Eddings in the wake of the
arrest, the judge found a strong likelihood that Eddings
would again commit a criminal act of violence if released.
"hein~ous, L

7.

only

mitigating

circumstance

was

Eddings'

youth

and

finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh
the aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced
Eddings to death.
The

Court

sentence of death.

of

Criminal

Appeals

affirmed

the

It found that each of the aggravating

circumstances alleged by the State had been present.

It

recited

in

the mitigating

evidence

presented

by Eddings

some detail, but in the end it agreed with the trial court
that

only

the

fact

of

Eddings'

youth

was

properly

considered as a mitigating circumstance:
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the
time of the murder.
He stresses his family
history in saying he was suffering from severe
psychological and emotional disorders, and that
the killing was in actuality an inevitable
product of the way he was raised.
There is no
doubt that the petitioner has a personality
disorder.
But all the evidence tends to show
that he knew the difference between right and
wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and
that is the test of crimina! responsibility in
this State.
For the same reason, the
petitioner's
family
history
is
useful
in
explaining why he behaved the way he did, but it
does not excuse his behavior."

8.

II
In Lockett v. Ohio,

438 U.S.

586

(1978), CHIEF

JUSTICE BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule
which we apply today: 3
"[W] e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer •.• not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604.
Recognizing
authority

"that
is

the

imposition

profoundly

of

death

different

by

from

public

all

other

penalties," the plurality held that the sentencer must be
free to give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of
the defendant's character and record and to circumstances
of

the

Because

offense
the

proffered

Ohio

death

in

mitigation."

penalty

statute

Id.
only

at

605.

permitted

consideration of three mitigating circumstances, the Court
found the statute to be invalid.
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's

3 aecause we decide this case on the basis of
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), we do not reach the
question of whether the eighth amendment forbids the
execution of a defendant who was 16 ( at the time of the
offense.

yt'Ci. rs t:J r .ql~

9.
'

effort to develop a

.

system of capital punishment at once

consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to
the uniqueness of the individual.
of

the

common

law,

the

legal

Since the early days

system

accommodate these twin objectives.
began

by

treating

offenses,

with

a

~

Thus,

criminal

mandatory

struggled

the common law

homicides

sentence

of

to

as

death,_

capital

iLk
but: tJ:1,Q.n

d

~..;f

SQ.W~R t-...eG

all

has

allow eo£ exceptions) first through an exclusion

"

for those entitled to claim benefit of clergy and then by
limiting

capital

prepensed."
the

In

punishment

~

to

Qo~ ~n 1.country

murders

upon

"malice

we attempted to soften

rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences we

inherited

from

England,

first

by

grading

murder

into

different degrees of which only murder of the first degree
was a capital offense and then by committing use of the
death penalty to the absolute discretion of the jury.
408

By

u.s.

the

time of our decision in Furman v. Georgia,

238

(1972) , the country had moved so far from a mandatory

system that the imposition of capital punishment Mil eMs

~~ecome

arbitrary and capricious.

10 •

.

.

Beginning with the decision in Furman, the Court

4-~d~

has attempted to provide 9'WiQ&liAliS for a constitutional
death

penalty

consistent
Thus,

that

would

application

in

Gregg

plurality

held

capricious

v.

and

the

penalty

both

fairness

Georgia,

that

death

serve

428
danger

could

be

goals
to

u.s.

of measured,

the
153

of

an

met

a4:~4.....t.

iAQi~&wsl.

(1976),

the

arbitary

and

"by

a

carefully

drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority
is given adequate information and guidance."
By

its

requirement

aggravating
statute,
"any

that

circumstances

and

by

its

mitigating

the

jury

listed

direction

to

circumstances,"

in
the
the

Id. at 195.

find
the

one
death

jury

of

the

penalty

to consider

Georgia

statute

properly confined and directed the jury's attention to the
circumstances

of

characteristics of

the

particular

crime

and

the person who committed

to

"the

the crime."

Id. at 197. 4

4 "[T]he
jury's
attention
is
focused
on
the
characteristics of the person who committed the crime:
.•. Are there any special facts about this defendant that
mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e.g., his
youth, the extent of his cooperation with the police, his
emotional state at the time of the crime)." 428 u.s., at
197 ..

11.

Similarly,

u.s.

280

in

woodson

v.

North

Carolina,

428

the plurality held that mandatory death

(1976),

sentencing was not a permissible response to the problem
of arbitrary

~A~

As the history

jury discretion.

of capital punishment had shown, such an approach to the
problem of discretion could not succeed while the eighth
amendment required that the individual be given his due:
"the

fundamental

Eighth

Amendment

character

and

constitutionally
inflicting

the

(Harry)

for

humanity

requires

record of

circumstances

Roberts

respect

of

the

the

v.

consideration

particular

of

part

death."

Louisiana,

431

Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428
Thus,

the

- - - - - - --: : : :-- d>s/

rule

s

of

the
the

individual offender and the

indispensable
penalty

underlying

in

Lockett

offense
of

the

Id.
U.S.

u.s.

at

as

process
304. 5
633

a

of
See

(1977):

325 (1976).

followed

from

the

5 "A
that
accords
no
significance
to
relevant fa e ees of the character and record of the
individual offender or the circumstances of the particular
offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ~ lt~ ma t e
punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or
mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
humankind.
It
treats
all
persons
convicted
of
a
designated offense not as uniquely
individual human
beings." Ibid

12.

earlier

decisions

of

the

Court

and

from

the

Court's

insistence that capital punishment be impose El fairlyJ and

wtU-~••""*"'~IL
consistently or
A

)

not

at

all.

By

requiring

that

the

sentencer be permitted to focus "on the characteristics of
the person who committed the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428
t-ec:o{t\ I Zt:S -fh«- -f

u.s.,
11

at 197, the rule in Lockett

• .. • r-es"', r-(' !I'" ...../
justice\
that r there

be

re£~es

taken

into

%he

aem«Rd of

account

the

circumstances of the offense together with the character
and propensities of the offender."

302

u.s.

51, 55 (1937).

Pennsylvania v. Ashe,

By holding that the sentencer in

capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant
mitigating factor,

the rule in Lockett recognizes that a

consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is
a false consistency.
III

We

now

apply

the

circumstances of this case. 6

rule

in

Lockett

to

the

The trial judge stated that

6 Edd ings did not argue to the trial court or to
the Court of Criminal Appeals on his direct appeal that
the sentencing procedure violated the rule in Lockett.
Nor did he include the argument on Lockett in his petition
for
certiorari.
Even so, ,~ we
bel1eve
that
in
the
circumstances here it is appropriate to treat the question
as one raised below and properly before us.
'Fe- Se-EjiA wit:A., Eddings did raise the argument in
Footnote continued on next page.

13.
'

.

"in following the law," he could not "consider the fact of
this young man's violent background."

There is no dispute

that by "violent background" the trial judge was referring
to the mitigating evidence

of Eddings'

family history. 7

his petition for rehearing to the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
In that petition, he explicitly argued that the
failure of the trial court or Court of Criminal Appeals to
consider his emotional condition or family background as
mitigating circumstances violated the decision of this
Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 u.s. 586 (1980).
See
Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting Brief, Proposition
III,
at 10
("This Court,
by
its
intepretation of
mitigating circumstances, has effectively limited the
scope of mitigaiton and that limitation renders the
Oklahoma death penalty statute unconstitutional").
The Court of Criminal Appeals will entertain new
arguments upon a petition for rehearing as a matter of
course.
Rule 1.18 provides that a petition for rehearing
"shall briefly state the grounds upon which counsel relies
for a hearing and show either that some question decisive
of the case and duly submitted by the counsel has been
overlooked by the Court;
or, that the decision is in
conflict with an express statute or controlling decision
to which the attention of the Court was not called either
in brief or oral argument" (emphasis added). See Bias v.
State, 561 P.2d 523, 538 (1977); Cooper v. State, 432 P.2d
951 (1967). The Court of Criminal Appeals denied Eddings'
petition for rehearing stating that it had given it full
consideration
and
had
been
"fully
advised
in
the
premises."
See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 476 (1975).
Moreover, in the interests of justice we may
consider a plain error in the record even when not argued
below or in the petition for certiorari.
See Rule
34.l(a), Rules of the Supreme Court;
28 u.s.c. § 2106.
We have used this power sparingly but it is applied
appropriately "in a case such as this, where the death
penalty was imposed in a plainly unconstitutional manner."
Beck v. Alabama, 447 u.s. 625, 631 n.6 (1980).
Cf. Wood
v. Georgia, _ _ u.s. __, __ n.5 (1981);
Vachonv. New
Hampshire, 414 U.S. 4 78 (197 4) ; Stern & Gressman, Supreme
Court Practice § 6. 27, at 460 (in review of state cases,
"the Court doubtless limits its power to notice plain
error to those situations where it feels the error is so
serious as to consititute a fundamental unfairness in the
proceedings").
7citation
argument.

to

Briefs

and

Transcript

of

Oral

14.

~~
From this statement it appealis that the trial

not

evaluate

wanting

as

the

evidence

in

a matter of fact,

mitigation

rather

judge did

and

he found

find

it

that as a

matter of law he was unable even to consider the evidence.
The

Court

of

It

found

that

approach.

not relevant because
excuse

from

Criminal

Appeals

the evidence

took

the

same

in mitigation was

it did not tend to provide a legal

criminal

Thus

responsibility.

the

court

c"onceded that Eddings had a personality disorder, but cast
this

evidence

difference

aside

between

on

the

right

basis

and wrong

test of criminal responsibility."
of Eddings'
behavior,
these

that

"he

. . • and

knew

that

the

is

the

Similarly, the evidence

family history was "useful in explaining" his
but

it

statements

did
it

not

"excuse"

appears

that

the

the

behavior.

Court of

From

Criminal

~

Appeals "~ c~ idere~ that

evidence

to

be

mitigating

which would tend to support a legal excuse from crimina!
liability.
We
courts

upon

find

that

the

the mitigating

limitations
evidence

violated the rule in Lockett.

placed

by

these

they would consider

Just as the state may not

15.

by

statute

preclude

mitigating
consider,
evidence.

factor,
as

a

the

sentencer

neither

matter

of

may

from

the

law,

considering

sentencer,

any

relevant

any

refuse

to

mitigating

In this instance, it was as if the trial judge

had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence
Eddings proffered on his behalf.
Court

of

Criminal

Appeals

The sentencer, and the

on

review,

may

find

that

relevant mitigating evidence is entitled to little weight.
But

they

may

not

exclude

such

evidence

from

their

consideration in the first place.
Nor

do

we

doubt

that

the

evidence

offered was relevant mitigating evidence.

Eddings

Eddings was a

youth of 16 years at the time of the murder.

Evidence of

a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is
typically

introduced

McGautha.

Perhaps

little weight.
the

time of

evidence

of

by

defendants

typically,

such

mitigation.

evidence

is

See
given

But when the defendant was 16 years old at

the offense ) there can
a

in

~
&I'Qlilbl ed

1\

family

be

1 it tle doubt that
'

~ ~~
history 1\ and oi

{

Q.,~
4emotional
~-......~..,...

disturbance is of the utmost relevance and importance.

!'

16.

The
considered

trial

a

judge recognized

relevant

mitigating

that youth must

factor.

But

youth

be
is

~~
more than a chronological fact.

It is a condition of life
~

when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to
d~mage. J Te-conside-r

psychological

Eddings' youth must be

to consider not only his bare age but those aspects of his
personal

history

of

such

importance precisely because he was so young. 8

The

fact .~_.-·(

that Eddings' was 16 years old tells us little.

The fact \

that he was a
with

and

ju~enile

a· neglectful,

I

. "" tells us a great deal.
consider

evidence

this

that

are

I

On

evidence

v~olent, family background )
remand, ~the state courts
and

weigh

it

the aggravating circumstances. 9

of

weigh the evidence for

(

with severe emotional problems and \

perhaps

....

must

development

them.

against

the

we do not

We require only that they

8 Quote
from Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, National Advisory Committee on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1976.

'i

9

.

9 Even
were
we
uncertain
that
the
Court
of
Criminal Appeals refused to consider the evidence of ~
mitigation as a matter of law we would still remand. A
the very least, the opinion by that Court is ambiguous
and in these circumstances a remand for clarification, i
not for reconsideration of all the evidence in mitigation
is appropriate.

'j~t~
~~

.

17.

consider all of the relevant evidence proffered by Eddings
in mitigation.
Accordingly,
extent

that

it

the

sustains

judgment is reversed to the
the

imposition

of

the

death

penalty, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

11/17/81 lfpjvde

Rider A, page 16 (Eddings)

Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition
that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally
are less mature and responsible than adults.

Particularly,

"during the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective and judgment"
expected of adults.
(1979).

Bellotti v. Baird, U.S.

u.s.

at

In a word, even the normal 16-year old

customarily lacks the maturity of adults.

In this case,

Eddings was not a normal 16-year old: he had been deprived
of the care, concern and parental attention that children
deserve.

On the contrary, he was a juvenile with severe

emotional problems, and had been raised in a neglectful and
sometimes even violent family background.

Moreover, there

was testimony that Eddings' mental and emotional development
were at a level several years below his chronological age •

..

'

2.

All of this is not to suggest an absence of responsibility
for the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this
case.*

Rather, it is to say that although the chronological

age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor, other
circumstances make clear in this case the relevance also of
the background and mental and emotional age of this
defendant.

*We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage
increasingly in violent crime. Nor do we suggest an absence
of legal responsibility. We are concerned here with the
severity of the ultimate penalty: the death sentence
imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed
youth with a disturbed child's immaturity.

dfl

November 17, 1981

80-5727

To:
Justice Powell
From:
David
Re:
Eddings--No.
80-5727

I wonder if you might cast your eye over this draft to see if
it's what you had in mind.

I still need to add several footnotes,

and it might be worthwhile to flesh out the discussion of youth as
a mitigating circumstance either in footnote or text.
I don't view the draft as an extension of Lockett or even really
as a clarification of Lockett.

Much rnore it is a defense of Lockett.

I was hoping that through this approach the Chief might decide to
reconsider his vote.

Now that he has assigned himself the dissent, I

don't suppose he will be inclined to shift.

But I did write the draft

with him in mind, as you will see.
If you would prefer to wait to look at this draft until it
is

comple~ely

finished, I will certainly understand.

lfp/ss 11/17/81
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Nov. 17, 1981

80-5727 Eddings v. Oklahoma
Your draft of 11/16 is excellent.
Apart from quite minor editing, and the suggested
revision of page 16, I have made no changes.
I agree that we should "flesh out the discussion
of youth as a mitigating circumstance".
extent in my rider for page 16.

~

I done this to some
A

There are other cases that

you might take a look at in addition to my citation of
Bellotti.

I think Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in

Danforth may have said something about youth, and possibly I
did in my recent concurring opinion in the Utah abortion
case.

I cited Frankfurter in my Bellotti opinion.

Feel

entirely free to revise or edit what I have written, and
perhaps supplement it in a footnote.
We can be sure that the dissent will emphasize
Eddings' statements and absence of remorse after the murder.
I think it might be well to make a more specific reference
to these at this time.
You have indeed made excellent use of the
authorities, and particularly Lockett.

Although I have

learned from experience not to be optimistic about the

.~·

2.

change of votes, I think you have made it particularly
difficult for some of the Brothers to dissent.
I now suggest that you follow our customary
procedure.

Have the clerk you select as editor take a close

look at form and substance.
I

If there are substance changes,

would like to see them before we go to a Chambers Draft.

When that is in hand, all five of us should take a close
look.

I view the case as important.

I do not wish to sound

like I have joined the school of "send 'em to Yale, and not
to jail".
Offender

I have a hunch that our system, with the Youth
~

and "juvenile justice') is too lenient on many

teenagers who persistently engage in violent crime.
capital punishment is something else.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

But

-

-
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MEMORANDUM
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DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powel.l, Jr.

Nov. 17, 1981

80-5727 Eddings v. Oklahoma
Your draft of 11/16 is excellent.
Apart from quite minor editinq, and the suggested
revision of page 16, I have made no changes.
I agree that we should "flesh out the discussion
of youth as a mitigating circumstance".
extent in my rider for page 16.

I done this to some

There are other cases that

you might take a look at in addition to my citation of
Bellotti.

I think Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in

Danforth may have said something about youth, and possibly I
did in my recent concurring opinion in the Utah abortion
case.

I cited Frankfurter in my Bellotti opini.on.

entirely free to

r~vise

Feel

or edit what I have written, and

perhaps supplement it in a footnote.
We can be sure that the dissent will emphasize
Eddings' statements and absence of remorse after the murder.
I think it might be well to make a more specific reference
to these at this time.
You have indeed made excellent use of the
authorities, and particularly Lockett.

Although I have

learned from experience not to be optimistic about the

2.

change of votes, I think you have made it particularly
difficult for some of the Brothers to dissent.
I

procedure.

now suggest that you follow our customary
'Rave the clerk you select. as editor take a close

look at form and substance.
I

If there are substance changes,

would like to see them before we go to a Chambers Draft.

When that is in hand, all five of us 9hould take a close
look.
like

I
I

view the case as important.

I

do not wish to sound

have joined the school of "send 'em to Yale, and not

to jail".

t have a hunch that our system, with the Youth

Offender Act, and "juvenile justice" is too lentent on many
teenagers who persistently engage in violent crime.
capital puni.shment is something else.

L.F.P., .Jr.

ss
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No. 80-5727

~ ( 5 fez L/

9 ro_rJ fc-clJ

Cert to Ok a Ct of Crim App
(Brett fo ct) (Cornish and
J
I )
l3u,~~e.z ach concurring Sc(Jcua !"e '}__,

Eddings

v.
Okla.homa

State/criminal
1. SUMMARY:

sentence:

Timely

Petr raises three chall enges to his death

(1) that one who was 16 years old at the time of the

murder cannot be sentenced to death;

(2)

that the murder which petr

commitled was not "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel;" and (3)

refusal to provide funds for an investigator and a psychiatrist.
2. FACTS and DECISION DELOW:

.•

In J\.1arch 1977, when he was
I

16 years old, petr took his brother's car and run away from horne

"-

with two friends and his sister.
tragic one.

By all accounts, petr's horne was a

His parents had divorced when he was two, and he had

spent several years moving back and forth between his mother's horne ,
his father's, and "group homes" run by the state.

According to

petr's testimony, his stepfather beat him and his mother was a
prostitute.

By the age of 14, petr had been charged with burglary

and been made a ward of the juvenile court.

When 15 years old, pe t r

was charged with assault with intent to do bodily harm and was
charged with another burglary.

In March 1977, petr was living at

home on probation, which petr broke by running away.
While driving through Okla in this flight from home, petr
and his friends stopped at a restaurant alongside the interstate
highway.

As petr was returning to the highway, he dropped a

cigarette on the floor of the car and momentarily lost control of
the car while picking the cigarette up.

A cus t omer at the

restaurant noticed petr's car momentarily swerve off the road, a nd
he reported his observation to Patrolman Crabt r ee, of the Okla
Highway Patrol, who happened also to be at the restaurant.

Crabtr ee

then pursued petr and eventually signaled to petr to pull off the
road.

One of petr's friends testified at trial that petr th e n said,

"If the fucking cop harrasse s me, I'll shoot him."

As Crabtree

approach e d petr's car, petr lo a de d one of thr e e guns he had taken
from his mother's housew

When Crabtre e was about six feet from the

car, petr stuck the shotgun out of his window and shot Crabtree .

("

squarely in the chest.

Petr immediately drove away.

Crabtre e died.

After a hearing, the Okla juvenil~ ct certified that petr
could be charged and tried as an adult.

Petr does not raise any

~

challenges to this hearing.
first degree murder.

Petr later pleaded nolo contendere to

At a sentencing hearing, the state presented

three highway patrolmen, the passengers in petr's car, some
passersby on the highway, a medical examiner, and a firearms expert
as witnesses.

On his behalf, petr presented his juvenile of ficer, a

ct-appointed psychologist, a professor of sociology, and a private
psychiatrist.

None of the three expert witnesses had inte rviewed

petr for more than an hourr and they had interviewed him about a
year earlier, before the certification hearing in the juvenile ct.
The trial judge found three aggravating circumstances:

(1) that the

murder was "heinous, atrocious and cruel," (2) that it was committed
for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, and (3) that petr
const itutes

R

cir cumstance:

threat to society.

The judge found one mitigating

that petr was only 16 years old at the time of the

murder.
The Okla Ct Crim App affirmed over petr's several
contentions.

Petr repeats the following three in this petn.

First, the ct rejected petr's ar0ument that the death
sentence violates the 8th Amencment when imposed upon one v1ho was 16
years old at the time of the crime.

In the ct's view, the 8th

Amendment requ ires only that petr 's age be considered as a
mitigating circumstancer but youth docs not bar the death sentence.

The ct also noted that the juvenile ct had ccrt1r1ea
!
I,

pe-er

Lu ::>1..a11u

trial as an adult, his youth notwithstanding.
Second, the ct rejected petr's

a~gument

that his sentence

was unconstitutional because of the vagueness of the aggravating
circumstance that it was "heinous, atrocious and cruel."

Noting

that Crabtree had had no reason to treat this incident as anything
more than a routine traffic stop, and therefore had no reason to
prepare himself for a confrontation, the ct concluded that this was
a cold-blooded murder which was "wicked," shockingly evil," and
"designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference
to ..• the suffering of others."
Third, the ct rejected petr's argument that the State
should have provided him with funds to pay for an investigato r and a
psychiatrist.
(

Petr relied on an Okla statute that provides funds

for a public-defenders office, at county expense, in counties with
populations of more than 200,000.
size.)

(Okla has two counties of this

Public defenders in such counties are authorized to use

county funds to hire investigators where necessary.

In smaller

counties, Okla statute does not provide for a public-defenders
office.

Rather, the statute provides that the

cour~s

may appoint

counsel as necessary from the local bar and pay them fees from a
court fund.

Such appointed counsel are not authorized by statute,

as public defenders are in larger counties, to hire investigators.
·rhe ct in this case held that the distinction between counties is
rational because larger counties have more indigent criminal
defenders.

For that reason, larger counties

~eed

a permanent

public-defenders office, and attendant staff, that smaller counties

do not need.

c

contendere.

In any event, the ct noted that petr had pleaded noLO
Petr therefore did not need an investigator of facts.

Nor, the ct concluded, did petr need fund s, for another psychi a trist,
for petr had presented psychiatrists at the sentencing heari ng who
testified on his behalf, as they had at the certification he a ring.
3. CONTENTIONS:
{l)

Petr contends th a t the imposition of a de ath

senten~e

upon one who was 16 years old at the time of his crime is c r ue l and
unusual punishment.

In support of his content i on that "child

executions" are unconstitutional, petr notes the national
recognition of the need for a juvenile justice syst em sepa ra te from
the criminal-justice system for adults.

Petr also notes that three

states {Nev., Tenn, Texas) statutorily bar exe cutions of tho se unde r
18 years old.

(~'

Petr also notes that only 20 ou t of 444 pri s o ners on

death row throughout the nation were under 20 years old as of Dec
31, 1976.

----------

Finally, petr contends that this Ct emph a sized the

significance of age in considering a death sent e nce in Roberts v.
Louisianu., 431 U.S. 633, 637 {1976).
In response, the State contends that youth should be a
mitigating circumstance, as in this case, but shouid not be an
absolute constitutional bar to the death sentence.
{2)

Petr contends that the ct below erred in holding that

the ''especially heinous" circumstance is not unconstitutionally
vague.

In petr's view, there was nothing "especially heinou s '' in

this murder, for the shooting was not preceded by any tortu r e and
Crabtree "presumably" died instantly.

[There is no indication in

the opinion of the Ct Crim App as to how quickly Crabtree died.]

Petr further contends that this murder surely was less reprenenslDle
(.......

than the 'murder in Godfrey v.

Geo~~,

--- U.S. --- ( 19 80) .

Finally, petr complains that the Ct Crim App affirmed the finding of
this aggravating circumstance on the ground that the murder was
"wicked" and "shockingly evil."

These are not the words of the

statute, petr contends.
In response, the State notes that this Ct has not
invalidated statutory aggravating circumstances such as this one.
The State further contends that the facts of this case support the
finding.
(3)

Petr contends that he was denied due process and

equal protection by the trial ct•s refusal to provide him with funds
to obtain a psychiatic examination and an investigator.

Petr

contends that such assistance was necessary to an effective defense.
The expert witness whom he presented were ineffective, petr
contends, because they had not examined him in over a year since the
certification hearing.
In response, the State notes that the Okla statute assures
that every indigent criminal defendant receives a lawyer.

In the

State's view, the Constitution does not require that the states also
provide expert witnesses.

In any event, the State contends that

petr was not prejudiced by the trial ct•s refusal in this case
because petr did not need an investigator and because petr in fact
had expert witnesses.
4. DISCUSSION:

I recommend a denial.

So long as the 8th

Amendment does not prohibit the death sentence, I see no sound basis
for drawing a line under the 8th Amendment on the basis of age.

Age

must be considered as a mitigating circumstance , to be sure.
Roberts v. Louisiana,

~~·

See

But the sentencing ct did consid e r

petr's age in mitigation in this case.
the facts of this case present an

11

Secbnd, the qu es tion wh ether

especially he inous .. murder i s a

question that this Ct, in the main, has decid ed to leave to the
states.

The decision of the Ct Crim App in thi s case do es not

warrant this Ct's review.

Finally, petr has failed to show th a t

Okla's method of providi ng indigent criminal defendants with counsel
deprived him of assistance or experts.
There is a response.

02/27/81

Morgan

Opin in petn

GM

03/05/81

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From: Greg Morgan
Re:

No. 80-5727:

Eddings v. Oklahoma:

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO

Here is a summary of what I mentioned to you
yesterday evening:
(1)

Petr has been

re~ esented

since the day he was arrested.

by

~he_sa~e

couns~

Neither in this petn nor in his

petn arising from his certification as an adult offender has
petr raised any claim about the competency of his lawyer.
(2)

Oklahoma law allows an accused to plead nolo

contendere to first-degree murder.

Petr did so.

Okla. law

also provides that one who pleads nolo shall be sentenced by
the trial court rather than by a jury.
(3)

Petr sought cert in 1978, raising several claims

about the juvenile-court hearing in which he was certified to
be tried as an adult.

Over claims that he had been denied

sufficient time to prepare for the hearing and a claim that he
had a constitutional right to treatment as a juvenile,
Court denied cert.
(4)
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Petr does not claim that he was denied any

opportunity to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing
hearing.

Furthermore, the trial ct and the Ct Crim App

expressly considered petr's youth in mitigation.

~.

(5)

We cannot "GVR" on Godfrey v. Georgia, for the

Olka Ct Crim App expressly considered Godfrey on petr's petn
for rehearing, and it held that Godfrey did not require any
change in its decision.

In sum, I continue to recommend a denial.

To be

sure, I too find it difficult to believe that one so young
could have murdered so callously if he understood the enormity
of his actions.

But the combined findings of the juvenile

court and the sentencing judge stand against my disbelief.

The

~

juvenile court, in the

cours~

of certifying petr to stand

trial as an adult, credited the testimony of two expert
witnesses who had examined petr.

Those witnesses testified

that petr understandsthe difference between right and wrong and
understood the consequences of his actions when he shot the
policeman.
evidence.

The sentencing judge heard and credited similar
And, of course, both the juvenile court and the

sentencing judge credited this testimony over the contradictory
testimony from experts on petr's behalf.
I look forward with great interest to seeing what the
other Justices make of this case.
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

80-5727 - Eddings v. Oklahoma

Because of my concern about the Court's action
in this case, I have prepared the attached dissenting
opinion.
In all candor, however, I have not yet
definitely decided that I will publish it.
Respectfully,

jvL
Attachment

J-.~;

l'O ,j

Cnl vl ._,

, ..j.

Mr 0 Just ice Bre:. ,,,0
Uro Justice Stewart
f.fr
Itr

ttr

0

o

0

r~r

o

Ur

o

From !

J·.1st ioe White
Marshall

Jtu~t 1ce

!w.t5. ce Dl<.:.~'~JP.un
J u::;t1ce Po ~ ell
J ustice R.::~bn.qu1st

Mr. Justi ce Stevens

C1:roulated1

80-5727 - Eddings v. Oklahoma

MAR 1 8 '81

Recirculat ed : - - - - -

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting .

In 1977, at the age of sixteen, petitioner murdered an
Oklahoma State Highway Patrol Officer .

Following his arrest,

petitioner was charged with first-degree murder.

The trial

court, after a hearing, granted the State's motion to certify
petitioner to stand trial as an adult.

That ruling was upheld on

appeal, see In re M.E., 584 P.2d 1340 (Okl. Crim. App. 1978), and
this Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari.
921.
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Petitioner
then entered a plea of nolo contendere to the
------

charge of murder in the first degree.l

After a hearing on

aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court
sentenced petitioner to death.2

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal

1 Under Oklahoma law, the legal effect of a plea of nolo
contendere is the same as that of a guilty plea. See-oKra.
Stat., Tit. 22, § 513 (Supp. 1978); see also Okla. Stat., Tit.
21, § 701.9 (Supp. 1978).
2 The trial court found that three aggravating circumstances
existed:
(1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel; (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding
or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (3) the
defendant would constitute a continuing threat to society. These
aggravating circumstances outweighed, in the trial court's

No. 80-5727

- 2 Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence .
Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (1980).
a temporary stay of

execu~ion .

See

That court later granted

App. to Petn. for Cert. 21-22.

Petitioner now requests that this Court issue a writ of
certiorari, arguing primarily that imposition of the death
penalty in his case would be cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.3

The Eighth Amendment defines the outer limits on the
severity of the punishment that a State may impose upon a
criminal offender.
667.

See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666-

The Amendment draws "its meaning from the evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society ."

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (plurality opinion).

Because judges routinely confront the difficult responsibility of
prescribing particular punishments for particular offenders, the
_,-

evolution of those standards both affects and is affected by the
performance of the judicial function.4

This case presents this

judgment, the sole mitigating circumstance, petitioner's youth.
3 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
Const., Arndt. 8.
4 In this respect, the Eighth Amendment is comparable to the
Due Process Clause. Because judges routinely confront procedural
questions, the evolution of standards of procedural fairness both
affects and is affected by the performance of the judicial
function.
In giving meaning to the words "due process of law,"
the Court has referred to the "flexibility and capacity for
growth and adaptation [that] is the peculiar boast and excellence
of the common law," Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530,
and has firmly refused "to stamp upon our jurisprudence the

No. 80-5727
-

3 -

Court with an exceptional opportunity--and in my opinion an
obligation--to give particular meaning to those standards.

The

question that the case presents is whether "the evolving
standards of decency" embodied in the Eighth Amendment are
transgressed by the imposition of the death penalty as punishment
for an offense committed by a sixteen-year-old juvenile.

The Court's disposition of that question by denial of the
petition for writ of certiorari is exceptional for two . reasons.
First, the Court's action today is tantamount to a ruling on the

-

merits because, unlike most votes on petitions for certiorari,
it
-:::.._

-

is safe to assume that no Justice would vote to deny this
petition if he had any doubt concerning the merits of the issue.5
Second, it is surely exceptional for the highest court in any
civilized nation to place its stamp of approval on the execution
of a juvenile.6

unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and
Persians." Id., at 529.
5
The principal reason for not publishing or explaining
dissents from denials of certiorari is therefore not applicable
in this case. Cf. Singleton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
439 U.S. 940, 942-946 {Opinion of STEVENS, J.).

6 In its effort to define the "evolving standards of decency"
that give meaning to the Eighth Amendment, the Court in the past
has examined the practices of other nations with respect to the
punishment of criminals. See, ~~' Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s.
584, 596, n. 10 {plurality opinion); Trop v. Dulles, 356 u.s. 86,
102-103 {plurality opinion).
In the present case, it should be
noted that Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of the International Bill of Human Rights
provides:
"Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age ...• " United
Nations, International Bill of Human Rights 23 (1978). Although

~

·

No. 8 0-5 7 2 7

- 4 These exceptional circumstances have induced me to record my
dissent from the denial of certiorari in this case.

My

perception of the controlling constitutional standard persuades
me that JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL are correct in their
opinion that this death

se~tence

should be vacated.

I therefore

respectfully dissent.

Congress has not ratified the Covenant, petitioner informs us
that it has been signed or ratified by 73 nations. Se e also
Wei s sbrodt, U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63
Min n . L • Rev • 3 5 , 4 0 ( 19 7 8 ) •
Of course, the practice in this country is of greater
relevance than that in foreign nations. A number of states
prohibit the execution of persons who were . below a specified age
at the time of their off e nse.
See, ~' Cal. Penal Code § 190.5
(West Supp. 1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-46a (f) (Supp.
1980); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.025 (1979) • And the statutes of
many other states specify that an offender's youth is a
mitigating circumstance to be considered in determining the
propriety of the death penalty. See, ~' Fla. Stat. Ann. §
921.141(6) (g) (West Supp. 1980); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §
413 (g) (5) (Supp. 1980); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2404 (j) (7) (Supp.
1979). See generally Weissbrodt, supra, at 72-73, n. 210.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MONTY LEE EDDINGS v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
APPEAL FOR STATE OF OKLAHOMA
No. 80-5727.

Decided March --, 1981

j UST!C:E STEVENS, dissenting.
In 1977 , at the age of sixteen, petitioner murdered an
Oklahoma State Highway Patrol Officer. Following his arrest, petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. The
trial court, after a hearing, granted the State's motion to certify petitioner to stand trial as an adult. That ruling was upheld on appeal, see In reM. E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim.
A pp. 1978), and this Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari. 436 U. S. 921. Petitioner then entered a plea of
nolo contendere to the charge of murder in the first degree.'
After ·a hearing on aggravating and mitigating circun1stances, the trial court sentenced petitioner to death. " The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed petitioner's
conviction and sentence. See Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d
1159 ( 1980). That court later granted a temporary stay of
execution. App. to Pet. for Cert. 21-22. Petitioner now
requests that this Court issue a writ of certiorari, arguing
primarily that imposition of the death penalty in his case
would be cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment. '
'l,J nder Oklahoma law , the legal elfect of a plea or 11olo omtendrre is the
same as that of a guilly plea. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, 513 (Supp. 197H);
see also Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.9 (Supp . l97H) .
' The trial court found that 1hree statutory aggravating circumstances /
existed: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrociou s, or cruel ; (2) the
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or prosecution; and (3) the defendant would constitut e a continuing·
threat to societ y. These aggr;11·ating circumstances outweighed, in th e
· trial court'sjudgment, the sole mitigating circumstance, petitioner's youth .
., .. Excessive hail shall not he ·required , nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inllicted ." U.S . Cons!. , ,\IJHit. 8.

*
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The Eighth Amendment defines the outer limits on the
severity of the punishment that a State may impose upon a
criminal offender. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651,
666-667. The Amendment draws "its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (plurality opinion). Because judges routinely confront the difficult responsibility of prescribing particular punishments for
particular offenders, the evolution of those standards both
affects and is affected by the performance of the judicial
function.
This case presents this Court with an exceptional opportunity-and in my opinion an obligation-to
give particular meaning to those standards. The question
that the case presents is whether "the evolving standards of
decency" embodied in the Eighth Amendment are transgressed by the imposition of the death penalty as punishment for an offense committed by a sixteen-year-old
juvenile.
The Court's disposition of that question by denial of the
petition for writ of certiorari is exceptional for two reasons.
First, the Court's action today is tantamount to a ruling on
the merits because, unlike most votes on petitions for certiorari, it is safe to assume that no .Justice would vote to deny
this petition if he had any doubt concerning the merits of the
issue. ~· Second, it is surely exceptional for the highest court
1

In this respect, the Eighth Amendment is comparable to the Dne Process Clause . Becausejudges routinely confront procedural qttestions, the
evolution of standards of procedural fairness bOLh affects and is affected
by the performance of the judicial fnnction. In giving meaning to the
words "due process of law," the Court has referred to the "flexibility and
capacity for growth and adaptation (that] is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law," Hurtado v. Califomia, I I 0 U.S. 5 I G, 530, and
has firmly refused "to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the l\1edes and Persians." !d .. at 529.
·· The principal reason f(H· not publishing or explaining dissents from
denials of certiorari is therefore not applicable in this case . CL Singleton
v. Co111missionn of Internal Revenue, 439 U. S. 940, 942-946 (Opinion of
STE\'ENS, .J.).
1
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in any civilized nation to place its stamp of approval on the
execution of a juvenile."
These exceptional circumstances have induced me to
record my dissent from the denial of certiorari in this case.
My perception of the controlling constitutional standard
persuades me that j USTJCE BRENNAN and j USTJCE MARSHALL
are correct in their opinion that this death sentence should
be vacated . I therefore respectfully dissent.

'' In its effort to dellne the "evolving standards of decency" that give
meaning to the Eighth Amendment, the Court in the past has examined
the practices of other nations with respect to the punishment of criminals.
See , r'. g .. Cohn v. Gemgia , 433 U.S. 584 , 596, n . 10 (plurality opinion);
TrojJ v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 , 102-103 (plurality opinion) . In the present
case, it should be noted that Article 6 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights of the International Bill of Human Rights provides : "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by
persons below eighteen years of age .... " United Nations , International
Bill of Human Rights 23 ( 1978). Although Congress has not ratilled the
Covenant, petitioner informs us that it has been signed or ratilled by 73
nations. See Weissbrodt, U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 Minn . L. Rev . 35, 40 ( 1978); see . generally International
Human Rights Treaties, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations , 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980).
Of' course, the practice in this country is of greater relevance than that
in foreign nations. A number of states prohibit the execution of persons
who were below a specified age at the time of their offense . See , e. g.,
Cal. Penal Code §I 90.5 (West Supp. 1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§53a-46a (f) (Supp . 1980); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.025 (1979) . And the
statutes of many other states specify that ~m offender's youth is a mitigating cirCLimstance to be considered in determining the propriety of the
death penalty. See, e. g., Fla . Stat. Ann. §921.141 (6) (g) (West Supp.
1980) ; Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27 , §413 (g) (5) (Supp. 1980); Tenn. Code
Ann. § :19- 2404 (j) (7) (Supp. I 979). See generally Weissbrodt, supra, at
72-73 , n . 210 .
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MONTY LEE EDDINGS v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT ·OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
No. 80-5727. Decided March -, 1981

JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
This case presents the extraordinary situation of a juvenile,
now just 20, sentenced to death for a murder he committed
when he was only 16 years of age. The trial and subsequent
proceedings in the Okl homa courts appear to have been
entirely regular, and I have no doubt as to petitioner's guilt.
My concern arises solely from the imposition of capital punishment for a crime committed by a 16-year-old youth.
Whatever may be said about the capability of some juveniles
of this age knowingly to commit shocking crimes, I think a
line should be drawn somewhere with respect to the imposition of death as a permissible penalty. 1
In my view, this case never should have been allowed to
come this far without the most serious consideration of a
grant of clemency by the appropriate state authority. But
the case is here/ and I believe the question whether some age
limit properly should be drawn under the Eighth Amendment, below which capital punishment would be cruel and
unusual, deserves our plenary consideration. Moreover, one
1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the International Bill of Human Rights draws a line at 18 years of age. Article VI thereof provides: "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age . ... " United Na.tionl:!, International Bill of Human Rights 23 (1978). To be sure, Congress has not ra.tified this convenant, but it reflects a judgment widely
held by civilized peoples.
2 Petitioner set>ks review on the ground that in his case the sentence of
death would constitute cruel and unusual punhohment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
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may hope with reason that during the period of our review
the issue will be mooted by an act of clemency.
Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari.
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MONTY LEE EDDINGS v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
No. 80-5727.

Decided March -, 1981

JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
This case presents the extraordinary situation of a juvenile,
now just 20, sentenced to death for a murder he committed
when he was only 16 years of age. The trial and subsequent
proceedings in the Oklahoma courts appear to have been
entirely regular, and I have no doubt as to petitioner's guilt.
My concern arises solely from the imposition of capital punishment for a crime committed by a 16-year-old youth.
Whatever ma.y be said about the capability of some juveniles
of this age knowingly to commit shocking crimes, I think a
line should be drawn somewhere with respect to the imposition of death as a permissible penalty. 1
In my view, this case never should have been allowed to
come this far without the most serious consideration of a
grant of clemency by the appropriate state authority. But
the case is here, 2 and I believe the question whether some age
limit properly should be drawn under the Eighth Amendment, below which capital punishment would be cruel and
unusual, deserves our plenary consideration. Moreover, one
1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of t.he International Bill of Human Rights draws a. line at 18 years of age. Article VI thereof provides: "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes corn.mitted by persons below 18 years of age . . . . " United Na.tions, International Bill of Human Rights 23 (1978). To be sure, Congress has not ra.tified this convenant, but it reflects a. judgment widely
held by civilized peoples.
2
Petitioner seeks review on the ground that in his case the sentence of
death would constitute cruel and unusual puni':ihment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
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may hope with reason that during the period of our review
the issue will be mooted by an act of clemency.
Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari.
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Motion of Petitioner for
Appointment of Counsel

EDDINGS

v.
OKLAHOMA
Petr's counsel, Jay C. Baker, requests appointment as counsel
for petr.

On Apr. 6, the Court . granted petr leave to proceed ifp

and granted cert limited to the first question raised by the petn.
Applicant has been a member in good standing of the Bar of this Court
since 1973.

Applicant has represented petr since his arrest for the

crime which eventually led to his sentence of death.
of petr that applicant be appointed as his counsel.
There is no response.
5/1/81
PJC

Schickele

It is the desire

dfl 10/24/81

BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

October 24, 1981

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

David Levi

No. 80-5727:

Eddings v. Oklahoma

Question Presented
Whether

the

execution of a youth,

eighth

amendment

prohibits

the

convicted of first degree murder, who

was sixteen-years-old at the time of the crime.
I.

Facts and Decision Below
The facts are uncontested. I repeat them in perhaps

excessive

detail.

On April

4,

1977,

Monty Lee Eddings,

a

2.

sixteen year old youth, went to the home of his fourteen year
old

friend,

Gary Molt,

and

proposed

that

the

runaway from their Camdenton, Missouri homes.

two

of

them

Monty was upset

because his father had become angry with him the night before
when

Monty

agreed

was

to go,

unloading
and

i terns

from

the

family

the two went to Eddings 1

took two shotguns and a

rifle.

van.

Gary

home where

they

Eddings suggested that they

could use the guns if they ran out of money, and he sawed the
barrel off of one of the shotguns.

They put the guns in his

brother's Volkswagen and took off for Joplin, Missouri, where
they planned to pick up Eddings' sisters.
At Joplin, the boys picked up Eddings' fourteen year
old sister,

Rhonda,

Clevenger.

The

and her
four

fifteen year old friend,

teenagers

set

out

southwesterly direction on Interstate 44.
license, none had a destination in mind.

driving

Terrie
in

a

None had a driver's
They drove aimlessly

stopping only to pick up a hitchhiker at the Oklahoma turnpike
gates and
they

were

to purchase soft drinks at a Howard Johnsons.
leaving

the

Howard

Johnsons

and

re-entering

As
the

highway, Eddings momentarily lost control of the car, swerved
off the road, into a ditch, and then back onto the highway.
service

station

incident
Howard

to

attendant

Officer

Johnson's.

investigate.

saw

Crabtree
The

this
who

Officer

happen

was
left

and

having
shortly

reported
coffee

at

thereafter

A
the
the
to

3.

Some twenty minutes later, the Officer caught up to
the

youthful

became
going

angry
to

hassled

caravan
saying

blow
by

him

the

and
if

signalled

the

away"

pigs."

"pig

and

He

them

tried

to

stop.

Eddings

to stop him,

that

"he

was

tired

brought

the

car

to

a

he was

of

being

stop.

He

reached behind the seat, picked up the shotgun, and loaded it
with a single shell.
hitting

the

mumbling

Officer

When the Officer approached, he fired,
in

"mumbo-jumbo,"

the

chest.

saying

He drove

off,

shaking,

"I would rather have shot an

Officer than go back to where I live."

He told the others to

throw the guns out of the car, and he continued driving.
were

apprehended

by

the

highway

patrol

shortly

They

thereafter.

Officer Crabtree was dead.
Eddings was arrested and taken to the Creek County
Department

held

in

He stood for an hour or two staring at the wall.

At

Sheriff's
custody.
one point

he

where

looked over

he

his

was

questioned

shoulder

at

the

and

officers

and

stated that "if he was loose • • • he would shoot [them] all."
Later that evening when the officer refused to turn off the
light in his cell Eddings threatened the Officer:

"Now I have

shot one of you people, and I'll get you too if you don't turn
this light out."
Eddings was certified
The court found
wrong, and

that he was

to stand trial as an adult.

"capable of

knowing right from

to be held accountable for his acts." 1974 Okla.

Sess. Laws 570, ch. 272, §2.

The certification was affirmed

4.

on

appeal

and

this

court

denied

At

cert.

trial,

Eddings

entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of murder in
the first degree.
aggravating

and

A sentencing hearing was then held on the
mitigating

circumstances.

At

the

hearing,

Eddings presented evidence of his troubled youth.
Eddings' parents were divorced when he was five, and
until he was fourteen he lived with his mother, an alcoholic
of loose repute.

He lived without any rules or supervision.

By the time he was fourteen he could no longer be controlled
and

his

mother

sent

him

to

live with

his

father.

Monty's

father and stepmother were thrown into turmoil by his addition
to their family. His father held a steady job--a butcher in a
supermarket--while his stepmother was a school teacher who had
a

good

control

relationship
the

boy.

Attempts

physical punishment.

But

with Monty.
to

reason

they,
and

too,

talk

could

not

gave way

to

His parole officer testified that Monty

was scared and bitter,
excessive punishment.

that his father overreacted and used

v

At age

fourteen he was adjudicated a

delinquent on four counts of burglarly in the second degree
and stealing, and one count of tampering with a motor vehicle.
He was placed on probation but some months later was again in
trouble
placed
again

for
...
in a

~

an

..

assault

group home,

adjudged

and

for

mail

did well

delinquent

for

for

box
a

several

vandalim.
time,

He was

but was

then

This

last

thefts.

delinquency occurred four months before the murder.

5.

~
~~

--------------

Three
Their

psychologists

testimony

indicated

testified

that

~
on

Eddings

Eddings'

had

a

behalf • ./

-

"sociopathic
....---

...._,

personality"
and that his mental age was several years below
......__...
that of his chronological age.
suffered
his

from

parents'

There was testimony that Monty

rootlessness and
divorce.

One

that he never

psychologist

recovered from

testified

that

in

killing Officer Crabtree Monty was in reality seeking revenge
against the police officer who married his mother after his
parents were divorced.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge
sentenced

Eddings

circumstances:
cruel";

second,

to

death.

He

found

that

aggravating

first, the crime was "heineous, atrocious and
the crime was commit ted for

avoiding lawful arrest or prosecution;
found

three

Monty's

threatening

the purpose of

and third the court

statements

to

the

officers

after he was taken into custody indicated, beyond a reasonable
doubt,

that there was a strong likelihood that if released,

Eddings would pose a continuing threat of violence to society.
As to mitigating

circumst ~ ces,

the court considered

~

Eddings' youth but not hi ~ ~mily backgr~ nd:

~

"And I want . . . all concerned persons to know, in /-~L-. --·
/'1
this particular case I have given very serious ~~~~
.
n
consideration to the youth of the Defendant when
~
this particular crime was committed. Should I fail
to do this, I think I would not be carrying out my
duty.
On the other hand, the Court cannot be
persuaded entirely by the youthfulness [sic] of the
fact that the youth was sixteen years old when this
heineous crime was committed. Nor can the Court in
following the law, in my opinion, consider the fact
of this young man's violent background.
So not

--

6.

finding any_ mitigation other than the youthfulness,
and
fai li ng
to
ffnd that it has sufficiently
softened the aggravating circumstances that the
Court has found beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court
has no alternative in this particular case other
than to sentence Monty Lee Eddings to death."
The case was automatically appealed to the court of criminal
appeals where the sentence was affirmed.
The court of appeals found that there was no eighth
amendment ban against imposition of the death sentence on a
juvenile.
requires

As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the amendment
only

that

circumstance.

youth

Although

no

be
one

considered
had

as

ever

a

been

mitigating
executed

in

Oklahoma who was under age 18 when the crime was committed,
the

capital

considered
because

punishment

either

in a

cruel

1924 case

of
or

a

16-year

unusual.

old

It

could

was

the Oklahoma court

not

not

be

"unusual"

stated

that

the

"death penalty should not be imposed against a boy under the
age of 14 years convicted of murder, unless it clearly appears
that

the

juvenile

offender

was

a

person

with

a

sense

of

reponsibility .

equal to that of an ordinary person of the

age 16 years."

It was not cruel because capital punishment

was not abhorred by public sentiment, nor would the execution
cause extreme pain and suffering.

Incredibly, the court never

asked whether the "evolving standards of a maturing society"
condemn

not

capital

punishment

punishment of one so young.

in

general

but

the

capital

7.

Turning to the specific facts of the case, the court
of appeals found

that the

trial

judge had correctly weighed

the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
that

each

of

the

properly found.
and

cruel";

three

aggravating

the

victim

the purpose of avoiding

shot

facts
the

Finally,
society";

of

circumstances

had

been

The crime was "especially heinous, atrocious
was

warning that he was in danger.

the

The court found

the case

officer
Eddings

to
would

a

police

officer

who

had

no

The crime was "committed for

... a lawful arrest or prosecution";
support the conclusion that Eddings'
avoid

being

"constitute

returned
a

to

continuing

Missouri.
threat

to

he made threatening remarks to the officers while

in custody and he had an extensive juvenile record including
crimes against persons.
These

aggravating

factors

were

very

outweighing the mitigating fact of his youth.
appeals

joined

the

trial

judge

in

rejecting

serious,

The court of
evidence

of

Eddings' upbringing or mental state as mitigating factors:
The petitioner also argues his mental state at
the time of the murder.
ij_e stresses his family
history in saying he was suffering from severe
ps ych oLogical and emotional disorders, and that the
killing was in actuality an inevitable product of
the way he was raised.
There is no doubt that the
petitioner has a personality disorder.
But all the
evidence tends to show that he knew the difference
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the
trigger,
and
that
is
the
test
of
criminal
responsibility in this State.
For the same
reason the petil.ioner 's f C!I!! i .ls-. histQ_ry is useful in
explaining wny he E>ehaved the way he did, but it
does not excuse his behavior."
....

~~ . . d ..
L--::::f~
· ---,

8.

Finding that the sentence of death was not imposed under the
influence of passion, that the evidence supported the judge's
finding of aggravating circumstances, and that the sentence of
death

was

not

excessive

or

disproportionate,

the

court of

appeals affirmed the death sentence.

II.

The

Court granted

whether

the

capital

punishment

question

eighth

on

My

does

not

punishment

of

arguments

cert

amendment

first.

amendment

Analysis

a

in

this

prohibits
I

juvenile.

case
the

to determine
imposition

will

address

of
that

tentative conclusion is that the eighth
place

a

juveniles,

the other way.

per

se

although

bar

to

the

certainly

capital

there

are

Having reached this conclusion,

I

would suggest that the Court not reach this eighth amendment
question

at

all:

for

the

Court

to

hold

that contemporary

standards do not condemn the capital punishment of a juvenile
is

not

merely

to

describe

these

standards,

it

is

also,

inevitably, to fix the standard and to approve it.
However, I would recommend that the Court
this

death

neither
the

sentence.

the trial

full

It

is

judge nor

apparent

from

the

overturn

record

that

-

the court of appeals considered

range of I Imitigating circumstances' ' present in this

c: se--parti: ularly . Eddings Z'l1 amily

-

-------

instability.

background

an~motional

These mitigating circumstances are of particular

9.

~~

9'~~
~~t-.A..U-4

weight in the case of a juvenile offender.

~e~~~
parce ~

say that these mitigating circumstances are part and

-------------------------------------------------The

the more gene :_:
a-:
l~m~i~t~l~
·g~a~t
~
in
~
g~c~i~r~c_u=~
-s~t
~a
~
~ce o_f__
youth.
in

Lockett

Louisiana,

v.

Ohio,

431 U.S.

438

633

u.s.

586

(1978),

and

o

Court

Roberts

v.

(1976), has held that the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer consider the
full

range of possibly mitigating circumstances.

The

lower

courts simply did not do so here.
Nor do I think that a remand on Lockett would be a
futile exercise,

b~

~

and that the state courts would simply re- ~
hA-

impose the death penalty.
the
this

That is possible, of course, but as ~

fact summary indicates, the aggravating circumstances in
case

chance

are

quite

that on a

sentence.

In

shaky;

a

good

remand the trial court will impose a

life

sum,

I

I

think

recommend

vacate, and remand on Lockett.

the

that

there

is

equivalent of

a

grant,

/3u./- ilt;;i~~ ~
~~~~--#.£.-?

A.

The

Eighth

~~Amendment:
Is There

a

Per

Se

Prohibition on the Capital Punishment of Juveniles?

In Gregg v. Georgia,

428

u.s.

153, 173 (1976), the

Court described the eighth amendment inquiry as a twofold one.
First,

the

amendment encompasses

"the evolving

standards of

decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

This

requires "an assessment of contemporary values concerning the
infliction of a challenged sanction." Contemporary values are

10.

distilled

by

looking

to

history

legislatures, courts, and juries.

and

to

the

actions

of

Second, and regardless of

public perception, the Court may insist that a penalty accord
with "the dignity of man."
the

punishment

not

be

At the least, this requires that
it

excessive:

may

not

inflict

unnecessary pain, and it may not be grossly out of proportion
to the severity of the crirne. 1
Recognizing that adoption of a per se rule against
the capital punishment of juveniles will "[encroach] upon an
area

squarely

legislative
citizenry

within

the

branch--both
through

prohibitable conduct,"

historic

state

the

and

prerogative

federal--to

designation

of

of

protect

penalties

the
the
for

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 418

1 In ~;raharn v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977), you
described the Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence:
"These decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause circumscribes the criminal process in three ways: First,
it limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those
convicted of crimes, Estelle v. Gamble, [incarceration without
medical care]; Trop v. Dulles, [expatriation for desertion];
second, it proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime, e.g., Weems v. United States,[l5 years'
imprisonment and other penalties for falsifying an official
document]; and third, it imposes substantive limits on what can
be made criminal and punished as such, e.g., Robinson v.
California, [incarceration as a criminal for addiction to
narcotics]."
It is not precisely clear to me where the per se rule
would fit in this eighth amendment analysis. The best horne, I
think, would be under the first heading you list above--the kind
of punishment. Perhaps, too, one could argue that the death
penalty is "grossly disproportionate" when levied upon a
juvenile.

11.

~J_- rl ,_ • f)
/,.-- '"'u-t ~

1

(Powell, J., dissenting), the Court will give greatest weight
to

the

first

branch

of

the

eighth

amendment

objective indicia of contemporary values.

inquiry--

the

I now turn to some

of these objective indicia.

1.

Common Law
At common law, children under 7 were conclusively

presumed to be incapable of forming criminal intent and thus
could not be convicted of any felony.

A child between 7 and

14 was presumed to be incapable of forming criminal intent but
the presumption was rebuttable by a showing to the jury that
the child could distinguish between right and wrong and did
understand

the

nature

presumption

was

extremely

gradually,

disappearing

and

at

illegality

strong

at

age 14.

of

age

7

his

act.

and

diminished

A juvenile over

The

14 was

treated as an adult.
'--

____.....

Thus,

the

common

law

placed

no

absolute

barrier

before the imposition of the death penalty upon children under
14.

-

And there is some evidence that the sentence of death was

imposed fairly frequently on juveniles in the 18th and 19th
centuries.
under

the

However,
age

of

14

execution of
appears

to

the
have

sentence on
been

juveniles

extremely

rare.

According to one researcher, only two children under the age
of 14 were executed in the United States in the period 1806 to
1882, and both were slave children.

In England no person under
executed since 1887.

the age of 18 has been

The Children Act, 1908, provided that no

person under 16 years of age at the time of conviction should
be executed.

In 1933 the provision was extended to persons

under 18 at the time of conviction and then in 1948 to
under 18 at the time when the offence was committed.

2.

Statistics in the Modern Period

According to Eddings' brief there were as of May 1,
1981, 63 defendants on death row who were juveniles under the
age of 20 at the time of the crime.

--

--

Of these 17 were under

---

the age of 18 at the time of the crime; six were under the age

--

of 17.

Eddings

execution of
period.

makes

a

juveniles has

fairly

persuasive

case

steadily declined

in

that

the

the modern

Using the best available figures on the age at the

time of execution, Eddings has compiled a set of statistics
for the period 1864-1967:

Age

16

17

18

19

Total

1864-1939

6

22

39

47

114

1940-49

7

13

17

21

58

J..;Jo

1950-54

0

2

2

10

14

1955-59

0

2

5

2

9

1960-67

0

1

0

1

2

~

According to this data, the last time someone under the age of
18 was

put

to death

juvenile executed
sent

to

the

was

in 1961

in Alabama.

The youngest

in recent years was a 14 year old who was

electric

chair

in

South

Carolina.

No

juvenile under age 18 has been executed since 1948.
figures

would

appear

to

show

a

marked

white

The above

decline

in

the

imposition of capital punishment on juveniles in the course of
this century.

3.

Legislative Approaches
According

penalty statutes.
per sons under
California,
Mexico,

New

to

(_

1

"1 :1

'f-)

the parties 34 states now have death

Of these 34,

8 prohibit the execution of

18 at the time of the offense.

Colorado,
Hampshire,

Connecticut,
and

Illinois,

Kentucky

These include _
New

Nevada,

(effective

1982).

In

addition Nevada imposes a prohibition at age 16, while Texas
sets

its

limit

at

age

17.

Thus,

9 out

of

~&..,J-

S~

the

34

states

permitting capital punishment would not allow the execution of

~1-

u-ud..e.../Rf

14.

Eddings, a 16-year old.
25

states

would,

execution.

and

Another way of putting this, is that
25

states

would

-------------------

not,

permit Eddings'

That's an even split. Of the 25 states permitting

imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, at least 22 of
them explicitly denominate youth as a mitigating factor.
At the federal level, S. 1401 was introduced in 1974
to

conform

the

federal

requirements of Furman.

capital

punishment

law

to

the

The Bill precluded capital punishment

for all defendants who were under 18 at the time of the crime.
The Bill passed the Senate but died in the House.
S. 114, a
---provision,
is now
favorably

out

of

Unlike S.

1401,

new effort to re-write the federal death
before

the

the

judiciary

It

Senate.
committee

v

was

on June

reported
9,

1981.

under the terms of this Bill, the fact that

the defendant was less than 18 at the time of the crime

is

7

only a mitigating factor--it does not place an absolute bar to
the death penalty.

4.

The Model Penal Code

-pi.Df
The

Model

Penal

Code

/ death

~I I

statute

states

an

exclusion for defendants "under 18 years of age at the time of
the commision of the crime." §210. 6 (1} (d).

The ALI has never

taken a position on whether the death penalty should or should
not be imposed on adult offenders.

However, it does strongly

/?LI

.a,., • f
-~t-'

JL4t ,

oppose

the

use

of

this

sanction

in

the

case

of

juvenile

murderers:
••.• there is at least one class of murder for which
the death sentence should never be imposed.
This
si tua €Ton ! s mur d er by juveniles.
The ' Institute
believes that civilized societies will not tolerate
the spectacle of execution of children, and this
opinion is confirmed by the American experience in
punishing youthful offenders.
Subsection (1) (d)
therefore
excludes
the
possibility
of
capital
punishment where the actor was under 18 years of age
at the time of the homicide.
co urse, any bright
line of this sort is somewhat arbitrary, and many
juveniles
of
lesser
years
have
the
physical
capabilites and mental ingenuity to be extremely
lethal. The Institute debated a motion to lower the
age of exclusion to 14 but rejected that proposal on
the ground that, however dangerous some children may
be, the death penalty should be reserved for mature
adults.
It should also be noted that 18 is the
limit of juvenile court jurisdiction contemplated in
Section 4.10 of the Code •••. The Institute defeated
a motion to delete [section (1) (d)] altogether and
relegate the offender's age to evaluation as one of
several mitigating factors.
This decision reflects
the view that no juvenile should be executed.

/i L/

Or

5.

State Cases

Eddings cites to a number of cases

in which state

courts of appeal have overturned a trial court's imposition of
a death sentence upon a juvenile.

These cases arise in states

that permit the sentence of death for a juvenile but require
that youth

be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

Bracewell v. State,
v. Maloney,

So.2d

464 P.2d 793

(Ariz.

(Ala. Cr. App. 1980);
1970);

See
State

Vasil v. State, 373

16.

So.2d 465 (Fla. 1979);
1979);

State

v.

Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss.

Stewart,

250

N.W.2d

849

(Neb.

1977);

Commonwealth .v Green, 151 A.2d 241 (Pa. 1959). Cf. People v.
Wilkins,

344

sentence);

N .E. 2d

724

(Ill.

People v. Hiemel,

1976) (court

reduces

372 N.Y.S.2d 730

(1975) (same);

People v. Martinson, 312 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970) (same);
State,

489

P.2d

Commonwealth,
parole

is

781

(Okla.Cr.App.

murder

Ezell v.
Fryrear

1971) (same);

v.

507 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1974) (life sentence without

cruel

and

unusual

punishment

when

applied

to

a

juvenile).
On the other hand,
death

row,

and

the

state

there are over 60 juveniles on
courts

have

sentences of several of these juveniles.

upheld

the

death

See High v. State,

276 S.E.2d 5 (Ga. 1981);

State v. Prejean, 379 So.2d 240 (La.

1979(;

255

State

v.

Shaw,

S.E.2d

799

(1979);

State

v.

Valencia, 602 P.2d 807 (1979).

6.

Juvenile Court Systems

The establishment of juvenile court systems and the
Federal Youth Corrections Act--which applies to youths of ages
16-22--indicate a recognition that juvenile criminals are not
mature adults and should not be punished as if they were.

Yet

having said this, we must recognize that the states do treat
the

juvenile

murderer--as

violent
a

special

offender--particularly
case.

By

permitting

the

juvenile

the

criminal

~ .. ~

~

courts to assume concurrent jurisdiction over violent juvenile
offenders,

the

states

appear

to

place

a

limit

on

their

solicitude for the juvenile offender.

7.

Academic and Professional Commentary

On
commentary

the

whole

appears

to

the

condemn

the

professional

and

academic

execution

Expressions of outrage are easy to come by.

of

children.

Thus, a 1962 New

York Times article, reports that "[t]he right to inflict death
on yongsters drew sharp condemnation at a recent University of
Chicago

conference

seventy

of

the

on

"Justice

naton's

for

leading

More

the Child."
juvenile

court

than

jurists,

attorneys, probation officers, educators, welfare and social
workers at a seminar expressed outrage 'that any state retains
the power to execute a minor.

~~
-~

I II

On the other hand,

there is a recognition in the
....
,,
literature that the problem of violent juvenile offenders has
become

increasingly

assembled

by

the

serious.

National

Thus,

Advisory

according
Committee

to
of

-

figures
Criminal

Justice in a 1976 report, youths of 17 years of age and under
account for

u_3

c:_f all felony arrests;

.
. .
~
1n
t h e c1t1es
t h ey ~

account for nearly 1/2 of all felony arrests.

They account ~

for 10% of homicide arrests, 19.4% of rape offenses, and 55%

d. ~~~h

'~

From 1960 to 1974 there has been a 241.4%

ltJ7a ~

increase in the number of male violent crime offenders under

~

of auto thefts.

~k

18.

the age of 18 and a 419.2 % increase of female offenders in
the

same age group.

been

a

marked

juveniles.

The Report notes

increase

Evidence

also

in

rates

indicates

that

of

that "there has

violent

that

a

be

every

indiction

-----"'--'"
that a small

-

segment

by

number

of

large

juveniles appear to be chronic law violators.
....

crimes

There seems to
of

the

juvenile

population is responsible for a highly disproportionate number
of

the

delinquent

acts

committed

by

juveniles.

This

especially true for delinquent acts of a serious nature.
juvenile

justice

system

is,

at

present,

not

is
The

adequately

---------~----~

equipped to deal with the growing tide of youthful violence or
with the violent or repeated offender."

Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, ~eport of the Task Force on Juvenile
Justice

and

Delinquency

Prevention,

National

Advisory

Committee on Crimninal Justice Standards and Goals, 1976, page

13.
The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing
Policy Toward Young Offenders

recognizes the problem of the

youthful violent offender and offers the following guidance on
sentencing:
"Crimes against the person test the limits of a
sepa_rate social polic ~ to_war a youth cr1me 1n the
crrffii na1 cour f .
Th e T ask Force is una nimous in
suggesting that the maximum sentencing options be
significantly lower for violent young offenders than
those for adults convicted of comparable crimes •..•
The Task Force is divided on the question of whether
offenders under twenty-one should ever be subject to
sentences of over five yers for any crime short of
murder."l6
"Murder remains the hardest of the hard
cases. The young offender who dominates or commits

19.

an intentional killing is the ultimate test of the
limits of diminished responsibility. The Task Force
agreed that maximum sanctions for young offenders
snould be lower
than those for adults.
The
pr1n1c1ple of diminished responsibility makes life
im risonment and death
enalties ina ro riate in
cases."
The Task Force
recommends
that
_s_e_n.. ,. t_e_n_c.:. .e.:. .s. ::.. .;;.. ;.::..o_,._f over five years for offenders under
eighteen convicted of murder and sentences exceeding
ten years for offenders between eighteen and twentyone be confined to cases where the offender is
responsible for taking more than one life or has a
substantial history of life-threatening violent
offenses." page 17.
Confronting Youth Crime, Report of the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward
Young Offenders {1978) {includes background paper by
Franklin E. Zimring)

But while the academics and professionals seem to
agree that juveniles should not be put to death, they are less
able to agree on the age at which this prohibition should be
set.

.

Thus, the Standard Juvenile Court Law of 1959, a p1ece

~
~~

of model criminal legislation prepared by the National Council

~~

on Crime and Delinquency, sets the childhood line at under 16.

~

The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force sets the line at age 21
although cautioning that "[t]he Task Force is convinced that
no single age during mid-adolescence should be used as a sharp
dividing
echoed

line
in

for

the

sentencing

background

policies."

paper

by

This

Frederick

sentiment is
Zimring,

law

professor at Chicago: "it is clear that any system that uses a
simple 'magic birthday' to determine the boundary of youth for
purposes of criminal justice policy is arbitrary and in sharp
contrast

to

the

insights

of

developmental

psychology

and

~

20.

common

sense."

International

Eighteen

p. 32.
Covenant

on

Civil

is
and

the

age

picked

Political

by

the

Rights,

see

below, and eighteen seems to be the line drawn in establishing
juvenile court jurisdiction in most states.

8.

International Treaty

Article

6 of

the Covenant on Civil

and

Political

Rights does not abolish capital punishment but it does forbid

._.___

the death penalty for youths under 18 and for pregnant women.
The American Convention on Human Rights similarly forbids the
capital punishment of offenders who were under the age of 18
at the time of the crime.

According to Eddings 7 3 countries

-7 3

set a limit on capital punishment at age 18, while virtually~~
all

of

the

Western

and

Eastern

European

countries

either

prohibit capital punishment entirely or draw a line at age 18.
There

does

seem

to

be

an

overwhelming consensus

among

the

civilized and not so civilized nations that the execution of
persons under the age of 18 is abhorrent.
Yet

the cogency of

this evidence of

international

feeling is undercut by the fact that the United States has yet
to

sign either

President

Carter

of

the
sent

treaties
the

listed above.

Covenant

on

Civil

Indeed,
and

when

Political

Rights to the Congress for

ratification he proposed that the

Covenant

a

be

ratified

with

reservation

to Article

6

that

--

..........

would

preserve

the

right

of

the

United

States

to

impose

capital punishment on any person--including juveniles.

9.

Conclusion

I reluctantly conclude from the above that there is
no consensus in this country against the capital punishment of

- -juveniles under

the age of 18.

~·

~

~

·-Although th·e --_p_uni shment has

been meted out to juveniles only infrequently, there are over
60 juveniles now on death row.
and

Despite the Model Penal Code

th~m~c-;it~r::ure, · th~ajority

c ~pital ~ hm~~~so __eer.mi t

of states permitting

impositio~~n

its

listing youth only as a mitigating factor.

juveniles,

Th~ test federal

death bill similarly treats youth as a mitigating factor but

~---------------------------~--------~----------The problem of the juvenile violent

'

not as an absolute bar.
offender

is

impression

receiving

is

that,

increasing

if

anything,

public

attention,

th~ublic

treatment of juvenile public offenders.

favors

and

harsher

See New York Juvenile

Justice Reform Act of 1978, Ch. 481, 1978 N.Y. Laws §48
14,

and

15

year

I

think

old

violent

my

offenders

to

be

treated

(13,
as

adults).

contemporary

-

you could write a principled opinion that

standards

punishment on juveniles.

condemn
But
___...

the

imposition

of

capital

you would be placing the Court

in a leadership role and somewhat in advance of public opinion
in this country.

J~

---.

Given that the execution of juveniles is a

~

.......

rare

event

and

that

mitigating factor,

all

states

rule

in

this

Although 18

is

youth

it may not be necessary for

get involved in this debate.
se

consider

area

to

be

a

the Court to

Moreover, the creation of a per

would have

some problems of

its own.

the obvious age to pick in light of current

juvenile court statutes,

voting laws, etc.,

it is not clear

from current psychological or sociological literature that 18

v

is a developmental watershed. As you noted in dissent in Fare
v. Michael Co., 442

u.s.

707 (1979):

"Minors who become embroiled with the law range from
the very young up to those on the brink of majority.
Some of the older minors become fully 'street-wise,'
hardened
criminals,
deserving
no
greater
consideration
than
that
properly
accorded
all
per sons suspected of crime.
Other minors are more
of a child than an adult. As the Court indicted in
In re Gault ••. the facts relevant to the care to be
exercised in a particular case vary widely. "

Finally,

the choice of any age is going to lead to peculiar

cases--the youth who is 18 and a day at the time of the crime.
Given all of the above and the deference that the
Court

desires

to

give

the

states

in

matters

dealing

with

sentencing, I cannot recommend that the Court establish a per
se

rule

against

the

imposition

of

the

death

penalty

on

juveniles under the age of 18 at the time of the offense.
On the other hand,
Court

write

an

opinion

I would not recommend

which

states

that

the

that the

execution of

juveniles is not prohibited by the eighth amendment.

I fear

that

merely

such

an opinion would

not

be

understood

to

be

J~
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descriptive of contemporary standards, but would be seen as an
endorsement of these standards.

I think that the Court should

not expend its moral capital in this way, particularly when it

---------------"'-"unnecessary to do so

is

decision

may

standard.

be

to

and when the effect of the Court's

retard

a

movement

to

a

more

civilized

In short, I suggest that the Court should not reach

the eighth amendment question it took the case to decide.

tv(~

~

~~
B.

~ 7~~-:

Youth as a Mitigating Circumstance

~&--~~
~

Should the court reject the eighth amendment per se
argument,

Eddings

overturned.

argues
argues

He

disproportionate

that

and

the

first

excessive

sentence

that
in

must

the

violation

yet

sentence
of

the

be
is

eighth

amendment, and second he argues that the lower courts erred by
refusing

to

consider

his

emotional instability as
Eddings

violent

family

background

and

mitigating circumstances.

quite properly argues

that

the

balance of

aggravating and mitigating factors in this case would seem to
tip toward leniency.
circumstances.
officer.

The first was that Eddings had killed a police

There

aggravating
questionable.

The courts below found three aggravating

is

no

question

circumstance.
On

the

The

basis

but
other

of

that
two

Eddings'

this
are

two

was
far

an
more

threatening

statements to the officers while in custody, and on the basis
of

his

one

juvenile

assault,

which

according

to

Eddings'

probation officer was

in the nature of

a

street fight,

the

trial court found that Eddings would "constitute a continuing
threat to society."

On the basis that Eddings did not want to

be returned to his home in Missouri, the court found that the
murder

was

"committed

for

the

purpose

of

preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution."
aggravating

circumstance

designed

was

to

avoiding

or

7

Presumably this
catch

fleeing

criminals, not someone running away from home.
And

if

the

aggravating

factors

are

weak,

boiling

down to the killing of a police officer, the mitigating factor
of youth is strong.
and

emotionally

To say the least, Eddings was an immature

disturbed

teenager.

The

crime

and

its

background verily proclaim the youthfulness of the offender.
Even

so,

and

despite

the

strength

of

Eddings'

argument that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating,
I

think

it

would

be

difficult

for

the

Court

to

find

the

sentence to be "grossly disproportionate" in this case without
adopting

a

per

se

rule,

or

strong presumption,

against

the
~

capital punishment of a juvenile.

To find the death penalty "gross ~,Y ~

without any provocation.
disproportionate"
death penalty

Eddings killed a policeman~

in this case, when the Court has found

to be a proper

sanction in the case of

th ~

~.
first
~

degree murder, would be the equivalent of establishing a per
se rule against the capital punishment of juveniles.
have

suggested

standards

in

above,

this

I

country

do

not

forbid

think
the

that

1-6

But as I

contemporary

capital punishment of

juveniles. Moreover, to find the sentence disproportionate in
this

case,

because

in

this

case

the

mitigating

factors

outweigh the aggravating, would involve the Court in policing
particular impositions of the death penalty in a way that it
has sought to avoid.
On the other hand, I think Eddings has a very strong
argument that when the lower courts refused to consider his
unhappy

family

circumstances

they violated decisions of
U.S.

637

(1978)

Lockett v.
Carolina,
Court

~

Ohio,

his

emotional

this Court

438

that

u.s.

280

586

(1978)

(1976).

the

instability

in Bell v. Ohio,

Roberts v. Louisiana,

428 U.S.

insists

and

431

u.s.

633

(1977)

and woodson v.

~

438
~

North

In all of these cases, the

sentencing

judge must consider

aspect of a defendant's character or

"any

record and any of the

cricumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death."

438 U.S. at 604.

Here

the courts appeared to confuse excuses that absolve one of any
criminal
sentence.

liability

with

excuses

that

merely

soften

the

Thus the trial held that he could not "consider the

fact of this young man's violent background."

The appellate

court reiterated this judgment:
The petitioner also argues his mental state at
the time of the murder.
He stresses his family
history in saying he was suffering from severe
psychological and emotional disorders, and that the
killing was in actuality an inevitable product of
the way he was raised.
There is no doubt that the
petitioner has a personality disorder. But all the
evidence tends to show that he knew the difference
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the

..:;o.

trigger,
and
that
is
the
test
of
criminal
responsibility in this State.
For the same
reason the petitioner's family history is useful in
explaining why he behaved the way he did, but it
does not excuse his behavior.

As

we

have

discussed,

violent father,

the

factors

of

a

broken home,

and of emotional disturbance

is

mitigating

16--and
factors

immature

are

for

his

important.

In

years
a

a

may not add up

to much in the case of a middle aged criminal.
offender

of

But when the
at

that--these

sense,

by

ignoring

such factors as these the courts below did not really consider
youth to be a mitigating factor.

The courts considered age,

but not the condition of being young.
The one problem with this basis for decision is that
Eddings makes the argument now for the first time.
that

this

- -----

is

a

capital case,

I

believe

plain error rule would be justified.

that

--

But given ~ .....

resort

to

the ~

Thus, without reaching

the question of disproportionality, or the question of a per
se

rule,

Lockett.

the Court may
On

remand

the

mitigating circumstances.

remand

for

courts

resentencing

below

should

in light of
consider

all

The Court may have reason to hope

that on a remand the courts below will not see fit to set the
same penalty--the aggravating circumstances are weak, and the
sentence may well come out differently on a second look.

Of

course if Eddings is re-sentences to death the Court may then
have to consider whether to impose a per se rule or find the
punishment disproportional on the facts of the case.

t/?.c,

~~

~
~
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III.

1.
contemporary

Conclusion

Although the question is not free from doubt,
standards

in

this

country

do

not

condemn

the

execution of juveniles convicted of first degree murder.
2.
juvenile

The punishment of death in a case in which the

offender

has

murdered

a

police

officer

is

not

"grossly disproportional."
3.
of

Because the courts below would not consider all

the mitigating

factors proferred by Eddings--factors that

are particularly important when the offender

is a

juvenile--

the sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing in light of Lockett.

lfp/ss 11/24/81

Rider A, p. 6 {Eddings)

EDD6 SALLY-POW
Under our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia,

u.s.

{1979), the firing of a single shot - especially

as a spontaneous reaction to the possibility of arrest would not be viewed as a "heinous, atrocious and cruel"
murder sufficiently different from any murder to qualfy as
an "aggravating" circumstance.

But the holdings of the

courts below as to the aggravating circumstances have not
been challenged by Eddings.

/
OP5727G, 11/24/81, Wilma
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ITEDSTATES

SUPREME

MONTY LEE EDDINGS, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
[November - ,

1981]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was ·Convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence
was imposed without "the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we
reverse.
I
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes.
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his father. After he momentarily lost control of the car, he was
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the
window and fired, killing the Officer.
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the
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trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App.
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo
contendere.
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent
part:
"Upon conviction . . . of guilt of a defendant of murder in
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . . .
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (emphasis added).
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circumstances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any
mitigating circumstances."
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat.,
Tit. 21, § 701.12 (4), (5), and (7).
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings

OP5727G, 11/24/81, Wilma
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent
him to live with his father. But neither could the father control the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to physical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was actual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or
something like this." 1 App. 121.
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a sociopathic or anti-social personality and that 30% of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out of it as they aged.
App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juvenile offenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App. 149. A
psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by
intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App. 181.
He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger, he did
kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was
doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated,
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society.
App. 180-181.
There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live." App.
121.
2
The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was doing it."
App. 172.
1
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At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He found that the State had proved each of the
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circumstances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigating factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188-189. But he
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance:
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact
that the youth was 16 years old when this heinous crime was
committed. Nor can the Court infollowing the law, in my
opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent background." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that the
only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and finding
further that this circumstance could not outweigh the aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced
Eddings to death.
The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain . . . in utter indifference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, there was evidence that at
one point on the day of the murder after Eddings had been taken to the
county jail he told to two officer that "if he was loose that he would shoot"
them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another time, when
an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings became
angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you people, and
I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based on these
two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a strong likelihood that Eddings would again commit a criminal act of violence if
released.
3
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The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the mitigating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating
circumstance:
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the
murder. He stresses his family history in saying he was
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disorders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all
the evidence tends to show that he knew the difference
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." !d., at
1170.
II

In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we
apply today: 5
' We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious,
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's understanding and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U. S. 420 (1980). Seen. 3, supra.
"Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S.
586 (1978), we do not reach the question of whether-in light of contempo-
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"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." ld., at 604 (emphasis in original).
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plurality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in
mitigation.... " I d., at 605. Because the Ohio death penalty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid.
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions,
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into different degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a
capital offense and then by committing use of the death penalty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of
rary standards-the eighth amendment forbids the execution of a defendant who was 16 at the time of the offense.
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our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the
imposition of capital punishment frequently become arbitrary
and capricious.
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S.
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is
given adequate information and guidance." I d., at 195. By
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its direction to the jury to consider "any mitigating circumstances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who committed the crime .... " /d., at 197. 6
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary
jury discretion. As the history of capital punishment had
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
"[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person
who committed the crime: ... Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e. g., his youth,
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time
of the crime)." 428 U.S., at 197.
6
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the penalty of death." I d., at 304. 7 See Roberts (Harry) v.
Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v.
Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976).
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier decisions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be permitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. 8., at 197, the
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice ... requires . . . that
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense
together with the character and propensities of the offender."
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). By holding
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual
differences i~ a false consistency.

III
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law,"
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." There is no dispute that by "violent background" the trial judge was referring to the mitigating evidence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this statement it is
7
"A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings .
. . . " 428 U. S., at 304.
8
Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not consider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance. . ..
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clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the evidence in
mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact, rather he
found that as a matter of law he was unable even to consider
the evidenc·e.
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach.
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant because it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Similarly, the evidence of Eddings' family history was "useful in
explaining'' his behavior, but it did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements it appears that the Court of
Criminal Appeals also considered only that evidence to be
mitigating which would tend to support a legal excuse from
criminal liability.
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude
the violent background, which I assume he meant was ... [that Eddings]
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (argument of respondent).
9
Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of the
death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of the
mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court examined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circumstances that ought to be weighed in the balance. Thus, the court's holding
that these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also
a holding that they need not have been considered by the sentencer in imposing capital pUnishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition
for certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the
facts of this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refus-
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the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law,
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such
evidence from their consideration. 10
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was
relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight.
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the
ing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the
sentencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not depend on citation to book and verse. See, e. g., New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928).
Moreover, Eddings specifically raised the argument upon Lockett in his
state petition for rehearing. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting Brief, Proposition III, at 10. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied
the petition, stating that it had given it full consideration and had been
"fully advised in the premises." See Rule 1.18, Rules of the Court of
Criminal Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon a petition for
rehearing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975). See also Wood v.
Georgia,-- U.S.--,-- n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625, 631 n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478, 479 n. 3
(1974).
10
We note that the Oklahoma death penalty sttute permits the defendant
to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat., Tit.
21, § 701.10. We require the sentencer to listen.
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offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe
emotional disturbance is of the utmost relevance and
importance.
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particularly, "during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443
u. s. 622, 635 (1979).
Even the normal 16-year old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and pater11
"Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, 41 (1967). "[A]dolescents, particularly in the
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover,
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system,
which share responsibility for the development of America's youth."
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime, 7 (1978).
12
As Justice Frankfurter stated, "[c]hildren have a very special place in
life which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juvenile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967).
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nal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, he was
a juvenile with severe emotional problems, and had been
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings'
mental and emotional development were at a level several
years below his chronological age. All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this case. 13 Rather, it is to say that
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be given the closest attention in sentencing.
On remand, the state courts must consider this evidence
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. We require only that they consider all of the relevant evidence
proffered by Eddings in mitigation.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

We are not utlaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly
in violent crime. See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
3 (1976). Nor do we suggest an absence of legal responsibility. We are
concerned here with the severity of the ultimate penalty: the death sentence imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth
with a disturbed child's immaturity.
13

dfl

11/24/81

To:

Justice Powell

From:
Re:

David
Eddings--No . 80-5727

John has been through this draft carefully.

~ootnote

1 is entirely new.

Old footnote 6 has

become footnote 8 and has been largely re-written in accord with ,
John's suggestions.
You might take a look at these two footnotes.

Otherwise

it is as you saw it before.
If you think the draft is ready, I will send it to
the printers.

If it would speed things along, I could have

the printer type it up as a first draft but wait to circulate
it.

until the others have had a chance to

-

r.~
~::(,

/,} C:..L..

f'

·r...J.U..-v ~1¥..& ..... :

5

g

1'3

'"

ICJ

,~...,

11

I~

"'

;(.-{.,

~JI/~4
•

dfl 11/24/81

Draft:

No. 80-5727, Eddings v. Oklahoma

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.

Petitioner

was

convicted of

first degree murder and sentenced to death.

Because this

sentence was

Monty Lee Eddings

imposed without "the type of individualized

consideration of mitigating
Eighth

and

Fourteenth

factors

Amendments

required
in

capital

by the
cases,"

2.

I

On April 4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth,
and

several

younger

Missouri homes.
brother,

and

companions

ran

away

from

They travelled in a car owned by Eddings'

drove

without

destination or

purpose

southwesterly direction eventually reaching
turnpike.

their

Eddings had

in the car a

rifles he had taken from his father.

in

a

the Oklahoma

shotgun and several
After he momentarily

lost control of the car, he was signalled to pull over by
Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol.

Eddings

did so, and when the Officer approached the car, Eddings
stuck

a

loaded

shotgun

out

of

the

window

and

fired,

killing the Officer.
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved
to have him certified to stand trial as an adult.

Finding

that there was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that
Eddings

was

not

amenable

to

rehabilitation

within

the

iuvenile svstem. the trial court aranted the motion. The

3.

(1978).

Eddings was then charged with murder in the first

degree, and the District Court of Creek County found him
guilty upon his plea of nolo contendere.
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in
pertinent part:
"Upon conviction .•• of guilt of a defendant of
murder in the first degree, the court shall
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine
whether
the
defendant
should
be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment ••.• In
the sentencing proceeding,
evidence may be
presented as to any mitigating circumstances or
as to any of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in this act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §
701.10 (emphasis added).

Section

701.12

circumstances;

lists

seven

aggravating

separate

the statute nowhere defines what is meant

by "any mitigating circumstances."
At

the

sentencing

hearing,

the

State

alleged

three of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in the
statute:

that

the

murder

was

especially

heinous,

atrocious, or cruel, that the crime was committed for the
purpose
that

of

there

avoiding
was

a

or

preventing

orobabili tv

that

a

lawful
the

arrest,

defendant

and

would

4.

701.12 (4),

evidence

(5), and (7).
In

mitigation,

Eddings

presented

at

the

hearing

of

troubled

his

supervising

testimony of

his

Juvenile

substantial
youth.

Officer

The

indicated

that Eddings had been raised without proper guidance.

His

parents were divorced when he was five, and until he was
fourteen Eddings
supervision.
Eddings'

lived with his mother without rules or

App.

109.

mother

prostitute.

App.

was

There
an

is

the

alcoholic

110-111.

By

the

suggestion

that

and

possibly

time

Eddings

a
was

fourteen he no longer could be controlled, and his mother
sent him to live with his father.
father control the boy.
way

to

physical

But neither could the

Attempts to reason and talk gave

punishment.

The

Juvenile

Officer

testified that Eddings was frightened and bitter, that his
father overreacted and used excessive physical punishment:
"Mr.

Eddings

found

the

only

thing

that

he

thought

was

effectful with the boy was actual punishment, or physical
violence--hittinq with a strap or somethinq like this." 1

5.

App. 121.
Testimony

from

other

witnesses

~A~A

indicated

that

, /t { t. 17

Eddings was r~1T - v- [emotionallyj disturbed~ ·n general and

1

at

the

time

of

the

crime,

and

that

his

mental

and

emotional development were at a level several years below
his age. App.
stated

that

134, 149, and
Eddings

had

a

173.

A state psychologist

sociopathic

or

anti-social

personality and that 30% of youths suffering from such a
disorder grew out of it as they aged.

App. 137 and 139.

A sociologist specializing in juvenile offenders testified
that

Eddings

was

treatable.

App.

149.

A psychiatrist

testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by intensive
therapy

over

a

testified further

15

to

20

year

period.
II

.

App.
.

181.

d. '

He
h

that Eddings was d1sassoc1at1ng at t e

time of the murder, and that "he did pull the trigger, he
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he
was

doing

it."

2 The

psychiatrist

than go back to where I live."

suggested

App. 121.

that,

if

?
I

6.

treated, Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to
society. App. 180-181.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial
judge weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
the

three

He found that the State had proved each of

alleged

reasonable doubt. 3

aggravating

circumstances

beyond

a

Turning to the evidence of mitigating

circumstances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a
mitigating

factor

of

great

weight:

"I

have

given

very

serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when

development, he acted as a seven year old seeking revenge
and rebellion;
and the act--he did pull the trigger, he
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he
was doing it." App. 172.
3The trial judge found first that the crime was
"heinous, atrocious, and cruel" because "designed to
inflict a high degree of pain •.. in utter indifference to
the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose
of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution."
App. 187-188.
The evidence was sufficient to indicate
that at the time of the offense Eddings did not wish to be
returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the
Officer's intent was to make a lawful arrest.
Finally,
there was evidence that at one point on the day of the
murder after Eddings had been taken to the county jail he
told to two officer that "if he was loose that he would
shoot" them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at
another time, when an Officer refused to turn off the
light
in
Eddings'
cell,
Eddings
became
angry
and
threatened the Officer:
"Now I have shot one of you
people, and I'll get you too if you don't turn this light

7.

this particular crime was commmitted.

Should I fail to do

this, I think I would not be carrying out my duty."
188-189.

But

he

would

not

consider

in

App.

mitigation

the

circumstances of Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional
disturbance:

" ••• the Court cannot be persuaded entirely

by the ••• fact that the youth was sixteen years old when
this heinous crime was committed.

Nor can the Court in

following

consider

the

law,

in my opinion,

this young man's violent background."
added).

the

fact

of

App. 189 (emphasis

Finding that the only mitigating circumstance was

Eddings' youth and finding further that this circumstance
could not outweigh the aggravating circumstances present,
the judge sentenced Eddings to death.
The
sentence
(Okla.

Court

of

death.

Crim.

App.

aggravating

of

Criminal

Eddings
1980).

circumstances

v.
It

Appeals
State,

found

alleged

by

616

that

affirmed
P.
each

2d
of

the State had

the
1159
the
been

4

present. \{ It recited the mitigating evidence presented by
Eddinqs in some detail. but in the end it aqreed with the

8.

"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the
time of the murder.
He stresses his family
history in saying he was suffering from severe
psychological and emotional disorders, and that
the killing was in actuality an inevitable
product of the way he was raised.
There is no
doubt that the petitioner has a personality
disorder.
But all the evidence tends to show
that he knew the difference between right and
wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and
that is the test of criminal responsibility in
this State. [citation] For the same reason, the
petitioner's
family
history
is
useful
in
explaining why he behaved the way he did, but it
does not excuse his behavior." Id., at 1170.
II
In Lockett v. Ohio,

438

u.s.

586

(1978), CHIEF

JUSTICE BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule

w~we

apply today:A(

~

"[W] e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer ••• not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death." Id., at 604
(emphasis in original).
-Recognizing
authority

"that
is

the

imposition

profoundly

of

different

death
from

by
all

public
other

penalties," the plurality held that the sentencer must be
free to give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of
the defendant's character and record and to circumstances

9.

of the offense proffered in mitigation

"

Because

only

the

Ohio

death

penalty

statute

Id., at 605.
permitted

consideration of three mitigating circumstances, the Court
found the statute to be invalid.
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's
effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once
consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to
the uniqueness of the individual.
of

the

common

accommodate
began

by

offenses,

law,

these

legal

system

twin objectives.

treating
with

the

s 4 nce the early days

all

criminal

has

Thus,

struggled

the common law

homicides

as

a mandatory sentence of death.

allowed exceptions,

first

to

capital
Later

through an exclusion for

it

those

entitled to claim benefit of clergy and then by limiting
capital

punishment

to

murders

In this country we attempted
system

of

mandatory

death

upon

"malice

prepensed."

to soften the rigor of the

sentences

we

inherited

from

England, first by grading murder into different degrees of

10.

f..1.u_
the absolute discretion of the jury.
decision in Furman v. Georgia,

By the time

408 U.S.

238

of A ~

(1972),

the

country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the
imposition

of

capital

punishment

frequently

become

arbitrary and capricious.
Beg inning with
has

attempted

death

penalty

~~ ::t '"ioc

to provide standards
that

would

serve

i.R Furman, the Court

for

both

a

constitutional

goals

of measured,

consistent application and fairness to the accused.
in Gregg v. Georgia,

428

u.s.

153

(1976),

Thus,

the plurality

held that the danger of an arbitary and capricious death
penalty could be met "by a carefully drafted statute that
ensures

that

the

information

and

requirement

that

sentencing authority
guidance."
the

jury

Id. ,

find

one

is given adequate
at
of

195.
the

By

its

aggravating

circumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by
its

direction

to

the

jury

to

consider

"any mitigating

circumstances," the Georgia statute properly confined and
directed the iurv's attention to the circumstances of the

11.

Similarly,

u.s.

280

in

woodson

v.

North

Carolina,

428

(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death

sentencing was not a permissible response to the problem
of arbitrary jury discretion.

As the history of capital

punishment had shown, such an approach to the problem of
discretion could
required

that

fundamental

not

the

respect

succeed while
individual
for

be

humanity

the Eighth Amendment
given

his

underlying

due:
the

"the
Eighth

Amendment ..• requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. "

t
Id., at 304.'

633

(

"1-

(1977) ;

See Roberts
Roberts

(Harry) v. Louisiana, 431

u.s.

428

u.s.

(Stanislaus)

v. Louisiana,

#)5..

[T] he
jury's
attention
is
directed
to
the
characteristics of the person who committed the crime:
••• Are there any special facts about this defendant that
mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e.g., his
youth, the extent of his cooperation with the police, his
emotional state at the time of the crime)." 428 u.s., at
197.
6 "A process
that
accords
no
significance
to
relevant facets of the character and record of the
individual offender or the circumstances of the particular

11.

Similarly,
U.S.

280

{1976},

in

woodson

v.

North

Carolina,

428

the plurality held that mandatory death

sentencing was not a permissible response to the problem
of arbitrary jury discretion.

As the history of capital

punishment had shown, such an approach to the problem of
discretion could
required

that

fundamental

not

the

respect

succeed while
individual
for

be

humanity

the Eighth Amendment
given

his

underlying

due:
the

"the
Eighth

Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. "

)
Id., at 304.'
633

(

{1977};

See Roberts {Harry} v. Louisiana, 431
Roberts

{Stanislaus}

v. Louisiana,

428

u.s.
u.s.

/)S" [T] he jury's attention is directed to the
character is tics of the person who committed the crime:
•.. Are there any special facts about this defendant that
mitigate against imposing capital punishment {e.g., his
youth, the extent of his cooperation with the police, his
emotional state at the time of the crime}." 428 u.s., at
197.

6 "A
1 relevant

process
that
accords
no
significance
to
facets of the character and record of the
individual offender or the circumstances of the Particular

12.

325 (1976}.
Thus,
earlier

the

decisions

rule
of

in

the

Lockett

Court

followed

and

from

the

from

the

Court's

insistence that capital punishment be imposed fairly, and
with reasonable consistency, or not at all.
that

the

sentencer

character is tics of
Gregg v. Georgia,
recognizes
taken

that

into

together

permitted

to

focus

the person who committed
428

u.s.,

"justice

account

with

be

By requiring

the

the

the crime,"

at 197, the rule in Lockett

...

the

"on

requires

circumstances

character

and

••.
of

that there be
the

propensities

offense
of

the

offender."

Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937}.

By

that

holding

the

sentencer

in capital cases must be

permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the
rule in Lockett

recognize~

that a consistency produced by

ignoring individual differences is a false consistency.
III

We

now

apply

the

rule

in

Lockett

to

the
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that by "violent background" the trial judge was referring

<(
to the mitigating evidence

of Eddings'

family history /

From this statement it is clear that the trial judge did
not

evaluate

wanting as

the

evidence

a matter of

in

fact,

mitigation

rather he

and

found

find

it

that as a

matter of law he was unable even to consider the evidence.
The

Court

of

It

found

that

approach.

not relevant because
excuse

from

criminal

Criminal

Appeals

the evidence

took

same

in mitigation was

it did not tend to provide a legal
responsibility.

Thus

the

II

/

the

court

\\

conceded that Eddings had a personality disorder, but cast
~

this

evidence

difference

aside

between

on

right

~

the

basis

and wrong

test of criminal responsibility."
of Eddings'
behavior,

that

"he

• • • and

knew

that

is

the
the

Similarly, the evidence

family history was "useful in explaining" his

but

it

did

not

"excuse"

the

behavior.

From

/ Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can
drawn is that the court did not consider petitioner's
juvenile record and family life to be a mitigating
circumstance"): Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did
not consider the fact of his familv backoround as a

d
~ be

14.

these

statements

Appeals

also

it

appears

considered

that
only

the

Court of

that

Criminal

evidence

to

be

mitigating which would tend to support a legal excuse from
criminal liability.
We
courts

upon

find

that

the

the mitigating

limitations
evidence

placed

by

these

they would consider

1
violated the rule in Lockett.i

Just as the state may not

)'Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals
that imposition of the death penalty in the particular
circumstances of his case, and in light of the mitigating
factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.
But he did not specifically argue that the
trial
judge erred
in refusing
to consider relevant
mitigating circumstances in the process of sentencing. In
rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court
examined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
held that Eddings' family history and emotional disorder
were not mitigating circumstances that ought to be weighed
in the-balance.
(}f ne.c.es&.i..tl'.,," the court's holding that
these
factors
were
irrelevant
to
an
inquiry
into
excessiveness was also a holding that he-se- ~£-S,[neea
not have been considered by the sentencer in imposing
capital
punishment . riJ1 . -t:.bQ
H-r~-t
~ce.
Similarly,
Eddings' argument in his petition for certiorari that
imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the facts
of this case comprises the argument that the sentencer
erred
in
refusing
to
consider
relevant
mitigating
circumstances proffered by him at the sentencing hearing.
In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our
decision in Lockett by name, the question of whether the
decisions below were consistent with our decision in
Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not
depend on citation to book and verse. See, e.g., New York
ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 60, 67 (1928).
Moreover,
Eddings
specifically
raised
the
argument
upon
Lockett
in
his
state
petition
for
rehearing.
See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting
Brief, Proposition III. at 10.
The Court of Criminal
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by

statute preclude

mitigating

factor,
a

the

sentencer

from

considering any

neither may the sentencer,

matter

of

law,

any

refuse to

consider,

as

relevant mitigating

evidence.

In this instance, it was as if the trial judge

had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence
Eddings proffered on his behalf.
Court

of

The sentencer, and the

cU..~ ft.-L.~if~~~
Appeals on review, may)\ find that

Criminal

relevant mitigating evidence.. is entitled to little
But

they

may

not give

it

no weight

(~

evidence from their consideration , hr
Nor

do

we

doubt

that

by excluding

t~ fi~•t

the

wei~h 2J-

plaee.

evidence

offered was relevant mitigating evidence.

such

Eddings

Eddings was a

youth of 16 years at the time of the murder.

Evidence of

a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is
typically

introduced

McGautha v.

by

California,

defendants
402

weight.

~~rhap~

mitigation.

See

u.s. 183, 187-188 and

193

~,........,k
typically, such ev idence.J\
given 1 it tle

1--~~,

(1971).

in

1

But when the defendant was 16 years old at the

16.

time

of

the

offense

there

can

be

~

~ieel e

IJ

doubt

that

evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a
~

harsh

father,

and

of 1\ emotional

disturbance

is

of

the

utmost relevance and importance.
The
considered

a

more

a

than

trial

judge recognized

relevant

mitigating

chronological

that youth must be
But

factor.

fact.

It

is

a

youth
time

is
and

,,

condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence
replete

and

with laws and

especially
mature

r(

to psychological damage.

and

in

their

/J' Our

history

is

judicial recognition that minors,
earlier

responsible

than

years,

generally

are

less

adults.~ ~Particularly,

, .. Adolescents everywhere,
from every walk of
life, are often dangerous to themselves and to others. 11
The
President 1 s
Commission
on
Law
Enforcement
and
Administration of Justice, Task Force Report:
Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime, 41 (1967).
.. [A]dolescents,
particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more
vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than
adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as harmful
to victims as those committed by older persons, but they
deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less
capacity to control their conduct and to think in longrange terms than adults. Moreover, youth crime as such is
not exclusively the offender 1 s fault;
offenses by the
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the
social
system,
which
share
responsibility
for
the
development of America 1 s youth. 11
Twentieth Century Fund
Task Force on Sentencinq Policv Toward Younq Offenders.
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"during the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors

often

lack

the

experience,

judgment" expected of adults.

perspective,

and

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.

622, 635 (1979}.
Even

the

normal

the maturity of an adult.
normal

16-year

old:

16-year

old

customarily lacks

In this case, Eddings was not a

he had been deprived of

the care,

concern and palten~ l attention that children deserve.
the

contrary,

he

was

a

juvenile

with

severe

On

emotional

problems, and had been raised in a neglectful, sometimes
even violent,

family background.

In addition, there was

testimony that Eddings' mental and emotional development
were at a level several years below his chronological age.
All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility
for

the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this

tf

case P

Rather,

it

is

to

say

that

just

as

the

place. Every state in the country makes some separate
provision for juvenile offenders.
See In re Gault, 387
u.s. 1, 14 (1967}.

f "J

A

we are not unaware of the extent to which minors

18.

chronological

age

of

a

minor

is

itself

a

relevant

mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background
and

mental

and

emotional

development

of

a

youthful

defendant be given the closest attention in sentencing.
On
this

evidence

remand,
and

the

weigh

the

it against

aggravating circumstances.
for

them.

state courts must consider
the evidence of

the

We do not weigh the evidence

We require only that they consider all of the

relevant evidence proffered by Eddings in mitigation.
Accordingly,
extent

that

it

the

sustains

judgment
the

is

reversed

imposition

of

the

to

the

death

penalty, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-5727
MONTY LEE EDDINGS, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
[November - ,

1981]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence
was imposed without "the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we
reverse.
I
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes.
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his father. After he momentarily lost control of the car, he was
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the
window and fired, killing the Officer.
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the
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trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App.
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo
contendere.
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent
part:
"Upon conviction ... of guilt of a defendant of murder in
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . ..
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (emphasis added).
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circumstances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any
mitigating circumstances."
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat.,
Tit. 21, § 701.12 (4), (5), and (7).
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent
him to live with his father. But neither could the father control the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to physical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was actual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or
something like this." 1 App. 121.
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a sociopathic or anti-social personality and that 30% of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out of it as they aged.
App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juvenile offenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App. 149. A
psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by
intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App. 181.
He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger, he did
kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was
doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated,
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society.
App. 180-181.
1
There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live." App.
121.
2
The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was doing it. "
App. 172.

80--5727-0PINION
EDDINGS v. OKLAHOMA

4

At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He found that the State had proved each of the
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circumstances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigating factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188-189. But he
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance:
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime
was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in
my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that
the only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and
finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the
aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced
3

The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain ... in utter indifference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, there was evidence that at
one point on the day of the murder after Eddings had been taken to the
county jail he told to two officer that "if he was loose that he would shoot"
them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another time, when
an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings became
angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you people, and
I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based on these
two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a strong likelihood that Eddings would again commit a criminal act of violence if
released.
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Eddings to death.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the mitigating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating
circumstance:
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the
murder. He stresses his family history in saying lie was
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disorders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all
the evidence tends to show that he knew the difference
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." !d., at
1170.
II
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we apply today: 5
'We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious,
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's understanding and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U. S. 420 (1980). See n. 3, supra.
' Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978), we do not reach the question of whether-in light of contempo-
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"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." Id., at 604 (emphasis in original).
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plurality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in
mitigation.... " Id., at 605. Because the Ohio death penalty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid.
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions,
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into different degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a
capital offense and then by committing use of the death penalty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of
rary standards-the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defendant who was 16 at the time of the offense. Cf. Bell v. Ohio , 438 U. S. 637
(1978).
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our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the
imposition of capital punishment frequently had become arbitrary and capricious.
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S.
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is
given adequate information and guidance." I d., at 195. By
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its direction to the jury to consider "any mitigating circumstances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who committed the crime .... " Id., at 197. 6
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary
jury discretion. As the history of Cqpital punishment had
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
6

"[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person
who committed the crime: ... Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e. g. , his youth,
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time
of the crime)." 428 U. S., at 197.
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the penalty of death." I d., at 304. 7 See Roberts (Harry) v.
Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v.
Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976).
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier decisions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be permitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime," Ckegg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 197, the
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice . . . requires . . . that
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense
together with the character and propensities of the offender."
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). By holding
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual
differences is a false consistency.

III
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law,"
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." ·App. 189. There is no dispute that by "violent background" the trial judge was referring to the mitigating evidence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this state7

"A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings .
. . ." 428 U. S., at 304.
8
Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not consider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance .. ..
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ment it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the
evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact,
rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to
consider the evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach.
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant because it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Eddings
v. State, supra, at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of Eddings'
family history was "useful in explaining'' his behavior, but it
did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements it appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only
that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a
legal excuse from criminal liability.
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude
the violent background, which I assume he meant was . . . [that Eddings]
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (argument of respondent).
9
Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of
the death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of
the mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court examined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circumstances that ought to be weighed in the balance. Thus, the court's holding
that these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also
a holding that t)1ey need not have been considered by the sentencer in imposing capital punishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition
for certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the
facts of this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refus-
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the sentencer from considering ariy mitigating factor, neither
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law,
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such
evidence from their consideration. 10
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was
relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight.
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the
offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent
ing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the
sentencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not depend on citation to book and verse. See, e. g. , New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Z immerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928).
Moreover, Eddings specifically raised the argument upon Lockett in his
state petition for rehearing. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting
Brief, Proposition III, at 10. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the
petition, stating that it had given it full consideration and had been "fully
advised in the premises. " See Rule 1.18, Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon a petition for rehearing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975). See also Wood v. Georgia , - U. S. - , - n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 631
n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire , 414 U. S. 478, 479 n. 3 (1974).
10
We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat.,
Tit. 21, § 701.10. We require the sentencer to listen.
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family 'history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe
emotional disturbance is of the utmost relevance and
importance.
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time- and condition of life when a person
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particularly "during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443

u. s. 622, 635 (1979).

Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16
year~old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and paternal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, he was
"Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967). · "[A]dolescents, particularly in the
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control
their conduct and. to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover,
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system,
which share responsibility for the development of Apterica's youth."
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978).
12
As Justice Frankfurter stated, "[c]hildren have a very special place in
life which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juvenile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967).
11
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a juvenile with ·severe emotional problems, and had been
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings'
mental and emotional development were at a level several
years below his chronological age. All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this case. 13 Rather, it is to say that
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be given the closest attention in sentencing.
On remand , the state courts must consider this evidence
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. We require only that they consider all of the relevant evidence
proffered by Eddings in mitigation.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.

3

We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly
in violent crime. See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
3 (1976). Nor do we suggest an absence of legal responsibility. We are
concerned here with the severity of the ultimate penalty: the death sentence imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth
with a disturbed child's immaturity.
'

/

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

December 1, 1981
Dear Chief:
In circulating my
write a dissent in No.
forgotten your earlier
in that case.
I will,

earlier memo stating that I would
80-5727, Eddings v. Oklahoma, I had
memo stating that you would dissent
of course, await your dissent.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

--

. §u.prmtt Qfettrl of tqt ~itdt .;§htftil
~lll'qmgton. ~. Qf. 20gt'!-~·

CHAMBERS OF"

j

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

December 1, 1981

Re:

No. 80-5727 - Monty Lee Eddings v. Oklahoma

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I will file a dissent in this case.
Regards,

.iu.p:rtm:t ar~ llf t4t ~tb ,jtatts
jtasfringhnt. :!fl. OJ. 2ll~'!$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

December 1, 1981
Re:

No. 80-5727

Eddings v. Oklahoma

Dear Lewis:
In the event that none of my senior colleagues in
dissent intend to write in this case, I shall.
Sincerely, ~

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

/

To: The Chief Justtoe
Just1oe Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justioe Stevena
Just1oe O'Connor
From: Juatioe Powell
Circulated:

------.DEC ·2 tl8j

Recirculated:
2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

80--5727

MONTY LEE EDDINGS, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA
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APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
[November - ,

1981]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence
was imposed without "the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we
reverse.
I
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes.
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his father. After he momentarily lost control of the car, he was
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the
window and fired, killing the Officer.
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the

80-5727-0PINION
2

EDDINGSv.OKLAHOMA

trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App.
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo
contendere.
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent
part:
"Upon conviction . . . of guilt of a defendant of murder in
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . ..
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (emphasis added).
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circumstances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any
mitigating circumstances."
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat.,
Tit. 21, §701.12(4), (5), and (7).
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent
him to live with his father. But neither could the father control the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to physical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was actual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or
something like this." 1 App. 121.
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a sociopathic or anti-social personality and that 30% of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out of it as they aged.
App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juvenile offenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App. 149. A
psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by
intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App. 181.
He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger, he did
kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was
doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated,
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society.
App. 180--181.
There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live." App.
121.
2
The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was doing it. "
App. 172.
1
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At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He found that the State had proved each of the
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circumstances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigating factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188-189. But he
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance:
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime
was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in
my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that
the only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and
finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the
aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced
The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain ... in utter indifference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, there was evidence that at
one point on the day of the murder after Eddings had been taken to the
county jail he told to two officer that "if he was loose that he would shoot"
them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another time, when
an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings became
angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you people, and
I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based on these
two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a strong likelihood that Eddings would again commit a criminal act of violence if
released.
3
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Eddings to death.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the mitigating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating
circumstance:
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the
murder. He stresses his family history in saying he was
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disorders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all
the evidence tends to show that he knew the difference
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." !d., at
1170.
II
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we apply today: 5
'We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious,
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's understanding and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U. S. 420 (1980). Seen. 3, supra.
5
Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S.
586 (1978), we do not reach the question of whether-in light of con tempo-
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"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." Id., at 604 (emphasis in original).
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plurality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in
mitigation.... " ld., at 605. Because the Ohio death penalty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid.
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions,
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into different degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a
capital offense and then by committing use of the death penalty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of
rary standards-the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defendant who was 16 at the time of the offense. Cf. Bell v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 637
(1978).
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our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the
imposition of capital punishment frequently had become arbitrary and capricious.
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S.
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is
given adequate information and guidance." I d., at 195. By
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its direction to the jury to consider "any mitigating circumstances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who committed the crime .... " Id., at 197. 6
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary
jury discretion. As the history of capital punishment had
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
6

"[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person
who committed the crime: ... Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e. g., his youth,
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time
of the crime)." 428 U. S., at 197.
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the penalty of death." I d., at 304. 7 See Roberts (Harry) v.
Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v.
Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976).
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier decisions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be permitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 197, the
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice . . . requires . . . that
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense
together with the character and propensities of the offender."
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). By holding
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual
differences is a false consistency.

III
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law,"
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." App. 189. There is no dispute that by "violent background" the trial judge was referring to the mitigating evidence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this state" 'A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings .
. . ." 428 U. S., at 304.
8
Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not consider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance. . . .
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ment it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the
evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact,
rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to
consider the evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach.
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant because it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Eddings
v. State, supra, at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of Eddings'
family history was "useful in explaining'' his behavior, but it
did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements it appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only
that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a
legal excuse from criminal liability.
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude
the violent background, which I assume he meant was .. . [that Eddings]
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (argument of respondent).
9
Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of
the death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of
the mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court examined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circumstances that ought to be weighed in the balance. Thus, the court's holding
that these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also
a holding that they need not have been considered by the sentencer in imposing capital punishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition
for certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the
facts of this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refus-
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the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law,
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such
evidence from their consideration. 10
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was
relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight.
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the
offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent
ing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the
sentencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not depend on citation to book and verse. See, e. g., Ne:w York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928).
Moreover, Eddings specifically raised the argument upon Lockett in his
state petition for rehearing. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting
Brief, Proposition III, at 10. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the
petition, stating that it had given it full consideration and had been "fully
advised in the premises." See Rule 1.18, Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon a petition for rehearing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975). See also Wood v. Georgia,-- U. S. - - , - - n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 631
n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478, 479 n. 3 (1974).
10
We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat., \
Tit. 21, § 701.10. Lockett requires the sentencer to listen.
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family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe
emotional disturbance is of the utmost relevance and
importance.
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particularly "during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443

u. s. 622, 635 (1979).

Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16
year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and paternal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, he was
"Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967). "[A]dolescents, particularly in the
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover,
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system,
which share responsibility for the development of America's youth."
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978).
12
As Justice Frankfurter stated, "[c]hildren have a very special place in
life which law should reflect." May v. A nderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J. , concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juvenile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967).
11
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a juvenile with severe emotional problems, and had been
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings'
mental and emotional development were at a level several
years below his chronological age. All 9f this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this case. 13 Rather, it is to say that
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be given the closest attention in sentencing.
On remand, the state courts must consider this evidence
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. We require only that they consider all of the relevant evidence
proffered by Eddings in mitigation.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.

13

We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly
in violent crime. See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
3 (1976). Nor do we suggest an absence of legal responsibility. We are
concerned here with the severity of the ultimate penalty: the death sentence imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth
with a disturbed child's immaturity.
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Petitioner was convicted in an Oklahoma trial court of first-degree murder
for killing a police officer and was sentenced to death. At the time of
the offense petitioner was 16 years old, but he was tried as an adult.
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides that in a sentencing proceeding evi9ence may be presented as to "any mitigating circumstances"
or as to any of certain enumerated aggravating circumstances. At the
sentencing hearing, the State alleged certain of the enumerated aggravating circumstances, and petitioner, in mitigation, presented substantial evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance. In imposing the death
sentence, the trial judge found that the State had proved each of the alleged aggravating circumstances. But he refused, as a matter oflaw, to
consider in mitigation the circumstances of petitioner's unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance, and found that the only mitigating circumstance was petitioner's youth, which circumstance was held to be insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
Held: The death sentence must be vacated as it was imposed without "the

type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors ... required by
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 606. Pp. 5-12.
(a) "[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, supra, at 604. This rule follows from the requirement that capital punishment be imposed fairly and
I
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with reasonable consistency or not at all, and recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency.
Pp. 5-8.
(b) The limitation placed by the courts below upon the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the above rule. Just as the State
may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of
law, any relevant mitigating evidence. The sentencer and the reviewing court may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence but may not give it no weight by excluding it from their consideration. Here, the evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional
disturbance petitioner offered at the sentencing hearing was of utmost
relevance and importance and should have been given the closest attention in sentencing. Pp. 8-12.
616 P. 2d 1159, reversed in part and remanded.
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Dear Lewis:
I shall await the dissent or dissents in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

dfl 12/30/81
To:

Justice Powell

From:
Re:

David
The Chief's dissent in Eddings--No. 80-5727

I think we come out of this on top, and I am not sure
that any reply is necessary.

I can think of four responses we

might wish to make.

1.

As a minor point, at page 3 we state that testimony at trial

indicated that "30% of youths suffering from [sociopathic]
disorders grew out of it as they aged."

The Chief points out at

page 8, note 8, that the psychiatrist who testified to this
figure also testified to a lower figure of 20%.

~add the word "approximately" to our statement.
could change "30%" to "20-30%."

Perhaps we could
Alternatively we

Or we can just ignore the

Chief's jab.

2.

The Chief suggests at various places that the state

court opinions are ambiguous.

He suggests as well that a remand

will be an exercise in futility.
We could respond to these statements by suggesting that
if the matter is ambiguous we think that the appropriate course
is to remand.

This is a capital case after all.

Also, requiring

that the lower courts adhere to Lockett is not an exercise in

futility and it is odd to characterize compliance with
constitutional requirements in this way.
result will be different on a remand.

We do not know if the

But surely that is beside

the point.

3.

The dissent notes that we state that evidence of a

troubled youth is

mitigating evidence of the utmost importance.

The Chief suggests that we are trying to weigh the evidence for
the lower courts.

To some extent he is right, and it is a

deliberate ambiguity in the opinion, as we have discussed.

But

the fact that this evidence is so important and that it was given
so little analysis by the lower courts tends to support our
position that the evidence simply was not considered.
add a sentence to this effect.

On the whole, I think we might do

best to do nothing on this score.

4.

We could

~

Finally, the Chief suggests in the last section that he

would "bite the bullet" and affirm.

He does not discuss at all

the serious eighth amendment question posed by the execution of
juveniles.

For this cavalier statement, I suspect the Chief will

lose Justice Blackmun.

At any rate we could say something about

the importance of the question, and that we are puzzled by the
dissent's "treatment" of the issue.
I can draft language, if you like, for any of these
changes if you think any desirable.
I hope Justice O'Connor is still on the wagon.

We

haven't heard a peep out of her since her rather ambiguous join-if that's what it was.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-5727

MONTY LEE EDDINGS, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
[January-, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Gourt.
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence
was imposed without "the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we
reverse.
I
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes.
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his father. After he momentarily lost control of the car, he was
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the
window and fired, killing the Officer.
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the

-
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trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App.
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo
contendere.
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent
part:
"Upon conviction ... of guilt of a defendant of murder in
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . . .
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §701.10 (emphasis added).
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circumstances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any
mitigating circumstances."
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat.,
Tit. 21, §701.12(4), (5), and (7).
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent
him to live with his father. But neither could the father control the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to physical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was actual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or
something like this." 1 App. 121.
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a sociopathic or anti-social personality and that approximately 30%
of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out of it as they
aged. App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juvenile offenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App.
149. A psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App.
181. He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger,
he did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he
was doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated,
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society.
App. 180-181.
' There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live. " App.
121.
2
The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was doing it. "
App. 172.
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At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He found that the State had proved each of the
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circumstances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigating factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188--189. But he
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance:
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime
was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in
my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that
the only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and
finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the
The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain . . . in utter indifference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, the trial judge found that
Eddings posed a continuing threat of violence to society. There was evidence that at one point on the day of the murder, after Eddings had been
taken to the county jail, he told two officers that "if he was loose ... he
would shoot" them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another
time, when an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings
became angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you people, and I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based
on these two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a
strong likelihood that Eddings would again commit a criminal act of violence if released.
3

I
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aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced
Eddings to death.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the mitigating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating
circumstance:
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the
murder. He stresses his family history in saying he was
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disorders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all
the evidence tends to show that he knew the difference
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." !d., at
1170.
II
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we apply today: 5
• We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious,
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's understanding and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U. S. 420 (1980). See n. 3, supra.
5
Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S.
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"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." Id., at 604 (emphasis in original).
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plurality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in
mitigation .... " I d., at 605. Because the Ohio death penalty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid.
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions,
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into different degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a
capital offense and then by committing use of the death pen586 (1978), we do not reach the question of whether-in light of contemporary standards-the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defendant who was 16 at the time of the offense. Cf. Bell v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 637
(1978).
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alty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of
our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the
imposition of capital punishment frequently had become arbitrary and capricious.
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S.
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is
given adequate information and guidance." ld., at 195. By
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its direction to the jury to consider "any mitigating circumstances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who committed the crime .... " Id., at 197. 6
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary
jury discretion. As the history of capital punishment had
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
(

"[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person
who committed the crime: ... Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e . g., his youth,
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time
of the crime)." 428 U. S., at 197.
6
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constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death." !d., at 304. 7 See Roberts (Harry) v.
Louisiana, 431 U. 8. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v.
Louisiana, 428 U. 8. 325 (1976).
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier decisions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be permitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. 8., at 197, the
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice . . . requires . . . that
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense
together with the character and propensities of the offender."
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. 8. 51, 55 (1937). By holding
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual
differences is a false consistency.

III
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law,"
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." App. 189. There is no dispute that by "violent background" the trial judge was referring to the mitigating evidence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this state7
"A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings .
. . ." 428 U. S., at 304.
8
Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not con-
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ment it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the
evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact,
rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to
consider the evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach.
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant because it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Eddings
v. State, supra, at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of Eddings'
family history was "useful in explaining" his behavior, but it
did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements it appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only
that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a
legal excuse from criminal liability.
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude
sider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance ....
the violent background, which I assume he meant was ... [that Eddings]
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (argument of respondent).
9
Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of
the death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of
the mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court examined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circumstances that ought to be weighed in the balance. The court's holding that
these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also a
holding that they need not have been considered by the sentencer in imposing capital punishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition for
certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the .facts of
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the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law,
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such
evidence from their consideration. w
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was
this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refusing to
consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the sentencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not depend on citation to book and verse. See, e. g., New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928).
Although Eddings' petition for certiorari did not expressly present the
Lockett issue, his brief in this Court argued it, and the State responded to
the argument. Brief for Petitioner 64-67; Brief for Respondent 5fr57.
The dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice, ante, at--, n. 1, states that
the courts below were not afforded the opportunity to consider this issue.
The fact is, however, that in his petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals
for a rehearing, Eddings specifically presented the issue and at some considerable length. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting Brief III,
at 10 ("This Court, by its interpretation of mitigating circumstances, has
effectively limited the scope of mitigation and that limitation renders the
Oklahoma death penalty statute unconstitutional"). The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the petition, stating that it had given it full consideration and had been "fully advised in the premises." See Rule 1.18, Rules
of the Court of Criminal Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon
a petition for rehearing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975).
See also Wood v. Georgia,-- U.S.--,-- n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 631 n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S.
478, 479 n. 3 (1974).
10
We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat.,
Tit. 21, § 701.10. Lockett requires the sentencer to listen.
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relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight.
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the
offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe
~elevance and
emotional disturbance is,f'
impm:tanoo.
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particu""Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967). "[A]dolescents, particularly in the
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover,
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system,
which share responsibility for the development of America's youth."
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978).
12
As Justice Frankfurter stated, "[c]hildren have a very special place in
life which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juvenile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967).
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larly "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S.
622, 635 (1979).

serious

only

Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16
year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and paterit is not
nal attention that.children deserve. On the contrary,) e was
disputed that
a juvenile with ~8: 818 ' emotional problems, and had been
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings'
mental and emotional development were at a level several
years below his chronological age. All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this case.-w Rather, it is to say that
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be gi•TiR UHi aliiliilt attiRtiitf in sentencing.
~We add that no court can be
1----------------~
where crime is
unaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly
in violent crime. See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal committed by a
Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, minor.
Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
3 (1976). Nor do we suggest an absence of legal responsibilitvl." We are
· ""' .~.
concerned herefawith the 1
ultimate penalty: the death sentence imposed or the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth
1
with a disturbed child's immaturity.

ff On remand, the state courts must consider

anner of the
imposition of
the

..,.u·~e::..:v:.!id
::!.e::::n~c~e~--,...--------,

and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. '~'i J?i
¥it e onl) li88t they eonsiel:er all ef the 1 ele oal"it e oiaenee
f3F9lf.81'8Q Qy i:fiifiiiRgB iM mi\iiga\iieM.
k-Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case b

all relevant
mitigating

- ·
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years below his chronological age. All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this case.~ Rather, it is to say that
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defend~uly considered
ant be gi-ven-t..fle-elesest attentier-f in sentencing.
ln
We add that no court can be
'
where crime is
unaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly
in violent crime. See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal committed by a
Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, minor.
-=-=:....:.....-- - - - - '

J

only

Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
3 (1976). Nor do we suggest an absence of le a! res onsibilit ·--w-eare
concerned here\with the sevmt~f-th ultimate penalty: the death sentence imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth
1
with a disturbed child's immaturity.
1

ff On remand, the state courts must consider thiSj

evid~Ilce

manner of the
imposition of
the

_ __ _______
and weigh it against the evidence ~fthe aggravating circum-~. rel. ~vant ·1
stances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. WB-+el~lgatlng .
quire-only-that-they-eonside~ll-oH-he-relevant;-evidenee
--proffered~mg:s in mi-tig-atio-n.
1'---Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case i::;
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larly "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S.
622, 635 (1979).

Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16
year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and paternal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, e was
a juvenile WI severe emotional problems, and had been
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings'
mental and emotional development were at a level several
years below his chronological age. All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for ~e crime of murder, deliberately committed in this case.~ather, it is to say that
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendt ~gi¥9J't·tl3e ':loseit attiution n sen encm .
<::fl4i On remand, the state courts must consider~ evidence
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. "We-i'eqmPe Qfl~ ..tl:J,a; t~ ~00 all o£ the LeleV:il:Rt euichmce
p

.

.

?

.

1t-t99ll.r Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case is

--------::::::

1'!/ We-Me of'let

naware the extent to which minors engage increasingly
in violent crime. See e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards an Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preventio
Report of the Task orce on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preve 'on,
3 (1976). Nor do e suggest an absence of legal responsibility,
e are
concerned here 'th the severity of the ultimate penalty: the death sentence imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth
with a disturbed child's immaturity.
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remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.

To: The Chief Justioe
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Juatjce Marshall
Justtoo Dlackmun
Justl ~o t~hnquist

tTust 1 oe Stevens
Justice O'Connor

From: Justioa Powell
Cirou.lated:

-----.iAN

.Reo1rou.lated:
3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-5727

MONTY LEE EDDINGS, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
.APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
[January-, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence
was imposed without "the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we
reverse.
I
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes.
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his father. After he momentarily lost control of the car, he was
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the
window and fired, killing the Officer.
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the
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trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App.
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo
contendere.
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent
part:
"Upon conviction . . . of guilt of a defendant of murder in
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . ..
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (emphasis added).
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circumstances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any
mitigating circumstances."
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat.,
Tit. 21, §701.12(4), (5), and (7).
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent
him to live with his father. But neither could the father control the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to physical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was actual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or
something like this." 1 App. 121.
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a sociopathic or anti-social personality and that approximately 30%
of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out of it as they
aged. App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juvenile offenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App.
149. A psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App.
181. He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger,
he did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he
was doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated,
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society.
App. 180-181.
There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live." App.
121.
2
The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was doing it."
App. 172.
1

l
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At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He found that the State had proved each of the
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circumstances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigating factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188-189. But he
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance:
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime
was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in
my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that
the only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and
finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the
3

The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain . . . in utter indifference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, the trial judge found that
Eddings posed a continuing threat of violence to society. There was evidence that at one point on the day of the murder, after Eddings had been
taken to the county jail, he told two officers that "if he was loose ... he
would shoot" them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another
time, when an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings
became angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you people, and I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based
on these two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a
strong likelihood that Eddings would again commit a criminal act of violence if released.

t
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aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced
Eddings to death.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the mitigating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating
circumstance:
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the
murder. He stresses his family history in saying he was
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disorders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all
the evidence tends to show th11t he knew the difference
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." !d., at
1170.
II
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we apply today: 5
' We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious;
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Lou isiana, 431
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's understanding and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U. S. 420 (1980). Seen. 3, supra.
5
Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
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"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." Id., at 604 (emphasis in original).
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plurality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in
mitigation .... " Id., at 605. Because the Ohio death penalty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid.
As THE CHIEF JusTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions,
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into different degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a
capital offense and then by committing use of the death pen586 (1978), we do not reach the question of whether-in light of contemporary standards-the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defendant who was 16 at the time of the offense. Cf. Bell v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 637
(1978).
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alty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of
our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. 8. 238 (1972), the
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the
imposition of capital punishment frequently had become arbitrary and capricious.
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. 8.
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is
given adequate information and guidance." I d., at 195. By
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its direction to the jury to consider "any mitigating circumstances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who committed the crime .... " !d., at 197. 6
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. 8. 280
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary
jury discretion. As the history of capital punishment had
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
6

"[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person
who committed the crime: . . . Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e. g., his youth,
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time
of the crime). " 428 U. S., at 197.
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constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death." I d., at 304. 7 See Roberts (Harry) v.
Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v.
Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976).
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier decisions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be permitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 197, the
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice . . . requires . . . that
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense
together with the character and propensities of the offender."
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). By holding
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual
differences is a false consistency.

III
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law,"
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." App. 189. There is no dispute that by "violent background" the trial judge was referring to the mitigating evidence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this state' "A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings .
. . ." 428 U. S., at 304.
8
Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not con-
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ment it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the
evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact,
rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to
consider the evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach.
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant because it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Eddings
v. State, supra, at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of Eddings'
family history was "useful in explaining" his behavior, but it
did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements it appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only
that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a
legal excuse from criminal liability.
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude
sider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance ....
the violent background, which I assume he meant was ... [that Eddings]
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (argument of respondent).
9
Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of
the death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of
the mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court examined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circumstances that ought to be weighed in the balance. The court's holding that 1
these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also a
holding that they need not have been considered by the sentencer in imposing capital punishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition for
certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the.facts of
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the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law,
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such
evidence from their consideration. w
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was
this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refusing to
consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the sentencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not depend on citation to book and verse. See, e. g., New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928).
Although Eddings' petition for certiorari did not expressly present the
Lockett issue, his brief in this Court argued it, and the State responded to
the argument. Brief for Petitioner 64-67; Brief for Respondent 55-57.
The dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice, ante, at--, n. 1, states that
the courts below were not afforded the opportunity to consider this issue.
The fact is, however, that in his petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals
for a rehearing, Eddings specifically presented the issue and at some considerable length. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting Brief III,
at 10 ("This Court, by its interpretation of mitigating circumstances, has
effectively limited the scope of mitigation and that limitation renders the
Oklahoma death penalty statute unconstitutional"). The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the petition, stating that it had given it full consideration and had been "fully advised in the premises." See Rule 1.18, Rules
of the Court of Criminal Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon
a petition for rehearing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975).
See also Wood v. Georgia, - - U. S. - - , - - n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 631 n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S.
478, 479 n. 3 (1974).
10
We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat.,
Tit. 21, § 701.10. Lockett requires the sentencer to listen.
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relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight.
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the
offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe
emotional disturbance is of the utmost relevance and
importance.
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particu11
"Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967). "[A]dolescents, particularly in the
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover,
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system,
which share responsibility for the development of America's youth."
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978).
12
As Justice Frankfurter stated, "(c]hildren have a very special place in
life which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juvenile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967).

80-5727-0PINION
12

EDDINGS v. OKLAHOMA

larly "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S.
622, 635 (1979).

Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16
year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and paternal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, he was
a juvenile with severe emotional problems, and had been
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings'
mental and emotional development were at a level several
years below his chronological age. All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this case. 13 Rather, it is to say that
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be given the closest attention in sentencing.
On remand, the state courts must consider this evidence
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. We require only that they consider all of the relevant evidence
proffered by Eddings in mitigation.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case is
13
We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly
in violent crime. See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
3 (1976). Nor do we suggest an absence of legal responsibility. We are
concerned here with the severity of the ultimate penalty: the death sentence imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth
with a disturbed child's immaturity.
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remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 11, 1982

No. 80-5727

Eddings v. Oklahoma

Dear Lewis,
I am pleased with the proposed changes. When
you circulate them, I will then circulate a revised
concurrence, eliminating any objections to your opinion and
any references to the characterization of the evidence and
the weight to be given it.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

fol. the Cb.tet .Justice

Jut1oe
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luatioe
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Justice
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Blackmun
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MONTY LEE EDDINGS, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA
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APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
[January-, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence
was imposed without "the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we
reverse.
I
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes.
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his father. Mter he momentarily lost control of the car, he was
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the
window and fired, killing the Officer.
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the
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trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App.
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo
contendere.
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent
part:
"Upon conviction ... of guilt of a defendant of murder in
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . ..
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §701.10 (emphasis added).
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circumstances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any
mitigating circumstances."
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, and that there was a·probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat.,
Tit. 21, § 701.12 (4), (5), and (7).
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent
him to live with his father. But neither could the father control the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to physical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was actual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or
something like this." 1 App. 121.
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a sociopathic or anti-social personality and that approximately 30%
of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out of it as they
aged. App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juvenile offenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App.
149. A psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App.
181. He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger,
he did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he
was doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated,
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society.
App. 180-181.
' There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live." App.
121.
2
The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was doing it."
App. 172.
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At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He found that the State had proved each of the
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circumstances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigating factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188-189. But he
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance:
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime
was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in
my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that
the only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and
finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the
' The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain 0 0 0 in utter indifference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." Appo 1870 Second, the
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, the trial judge found that
Eddings posed a continuing threat of violence to society. There was evidence that at one point on the day of the murder, after Eddings had been
taken to the county jail, he told two officers that "if he was loose .. . he
would shoot" them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another
time, when an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings
became angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you people, and I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based
on these two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a
strong likelihood that Eddings would again commit a criminal act of violence if released.
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aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced
Eddings to death.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the mitigating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating
circumstance:
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the
murder. He stresses his family history in saying he was
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disorders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all
the evidence tends to show that he knew the difference
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." I d., at
1170.
II
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we apply today: 5
'We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious,
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's understanding and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U. S. 420 (1980). See n. 3, supra.
"Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
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"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." ld., at 604 (emphasis in original).

Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plurality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in
mitigation .... " ld., at 605. Because the Ohio death penalty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid.
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions,
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into different degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a
capital offense and then by committing use of the death pen586 (1978), we do not reach the question of whether-in light of contemporary standards-the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defendant who was 16 at the time of the offense. Cf. Bell v. Ohio , 438 U. S. 637
(1978).
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alty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of
our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the
imposition of capital punishment frequently had become arbitrary and capricious.
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S.
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is
given adequate information and guidance." ld., at 195. By
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its direction to the jury to consider "any mitigating circumstances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who committed the crime .... " ld., at 197. 6
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina , 428 U. S. 280
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary
jury discretion. As the history of capital punishment had
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
"[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person
who committed the crime: ... Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e. g., his youth,
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time
of the crime)." 428 U.S. , at 197.
6
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constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death." I d., at 304. 7 See Roberts (Harry) v.
Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v.
Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976).
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier decisions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be permitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 197, the
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice ... requires . . . that
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense
together with the character and propensities of the offender."
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). By holding
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual
differences is a false consistency.

III
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law,"
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." App. 189. There is no dispute that by "violent background" the trial judge was referring to the mitigating evidence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this state"''A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings .
. . ." 428 U. S., at 304.
8
Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not con-
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ment it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the
evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact,
rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to
consider the evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach.
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant because it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Eddings
v. State, supra, at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of Eddings'
family history was "useful in explaining'' his behavior, but it
did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements it appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only
that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a
legal exG_use from criminal liability.
.
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude
sider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance. . ..
the violent background, which I assume he meant was ... [that Eddings]
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (argument of respondent).
9
Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of
the death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of
the mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court examined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circumstances that ought to be weighed in the balance. The court's holding that
these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also a
holding that they need not have been considered by the sentencer in imposing capital punishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition for
certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the facts of
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the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law,
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such
evidence from their consideration. 10
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was
this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refusing to
consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the sentencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not depend on citation to book and·. .'!rse. See, e. g., New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928).
Although Eddings' petition for certiorari did not expressly present the
Lockett issue, his brief in this Court argued it, and the State responded to
the argument. Brief for Petitioner 64-Q7; Brief for Respondent 55-57.
The dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice, ante, at--, n. 1, states that
the courts below were not afforded the opportunity to consider this issue.
The fact is, however, that in his petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals
for a rehearing, Eddings specifically presented the issue and at some considerable length. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting Brief III,
at 10 ("This Court, by its interpretation of mitigating circumstances, has
effectively limited the scope of mitigation and that limitation renders the
Oklahoma death penalty statute unconstitutional"). The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the petition, stating that it had given it full consideration and had been "fully advised in the premises." See Rule 1.18, Rules
of the Court of Criminal Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon
a petition for rehearing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975).
See also Wood v. Georgia,-- U. S. - - , - - n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 631 n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S.
478, 479 n. 3 (1974).
10
We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat.,
Tit. 21, § 701.10. Lockett requires the sentencer to listen.
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relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight.
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the
offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe
emotional disturbance is particularly relevant.
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particularly "during the formative years of childhood and
11
"Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967). "[A]dolescents, particularly in the
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover,
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system,
which share responsibility for the development of America's youth."
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978).
12
As Justice Frankfurter stated, "(c]hildren have a very special place in
life which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juvenile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967).

I
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adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443

u. s. 622, 635 (1979).

Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal16
year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and paternal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, it is
not disputed that he was a juvenile with serious emotional
problems, and had been raised in a neglectful, sometimes
even violent, family background. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings' mental and emotional development
were at a level several years below his chronological age.
All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for
the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this case.
Rather, it is to say that just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so
must the background and mental and emotional development
of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing.
We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage
increasingly in violent crime. 13 Nor do we suggest an absence of legal responsibility where crime is committed by a
minor. We are concerned here only with the manner of the
imposition of the ultimate penalty: the death sentence imposed for the crime of murder@" an emotlona1Iya1s urbe
youth with a disturbed child's immaturity.
On remand, the state courts must consider all relevant {
mitigating evidence and weigh it against the evidence of the
aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence
for them. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and
13
See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Report of
the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 3 (1976).

I
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the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
So ordered.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring. ~ ~
I write separately to address more fully the reasons why )
this case must be remanded in light of Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U. S. 586 (1978), which requires the trial court to consider
· rJ
0
and weigh all of the mitigating evidence concerning the peti- CIM iS$/
tioner's family background and personal history.*
Because sentences of death are "qualitatively different"
from prison sentences, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J.), this Court has
gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner
sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was
not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake.
*Despite THE CHIEF JUSTICE's argument that we may not consider the
Lockett issue because it was never fairly presented to the court below,
there is precedent for this Court to consider the merits of the issue. In
.Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 265, n. 5 (1981), this Court wrote:
"Even if one considers that the conflict-of-interest question was not technically raised below, there is ample support for a remand required in the
interests of justice. See 28 U. S. C. § 2106 (authorizing this Court to 'require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances')."
/ 0 #nl
Because the trial court's failure to consider all of the mitigating evidence
risks erroneous imposition of the death sentence, in plain violation of
Lockett, it is our duty to remand this case for resentencing.

,
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Surely, no less can be required when the defendant is a
minor. One example of the measures taken is in Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), where a plurality of this Court
wrote:
"There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which
cases governmental authority should be used to impose
death. But a statute that prevents the sentencer in all
capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight
to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to
circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.
When the choice is between life and death, that risk is
unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 438 U. S., at
605 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.).
In order to ensure that the death penalty was not erroneously imposed, the Lockett plurality concluded that "the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of
a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death." ld., at 604 (emphasis in
original).
In the present case, of course, the relevant Oklahoma statute permits the defendant to present evidence of any mitigating circumstance. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10. Nonetheless, in sentencing the petitioner (which occurred about
one month before Lockett was decided), the judge remarked
that he could not "in following the law . . . consider the fact of
this young man's violent background." App. 189. Although
one can reasonably argue that these extemporaneous remarks are of no legal significance, I believe that the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Lockett compels a remand so
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that we do not "risk that the death penalty will be imposed in
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty."
438 U. S., at 605.
I disagree with the suggestion in the dissent that remand- J
ing this case may serve no useful purpose. Even though the
petitioner had an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of the crime, it appears that the trial judge believed that
he could not consider some of the mitigating evidence in imposing sentence. In any event, we may not speculate as to
whether the trial judge and the Court of Criminal Appeals actually considered all of the mitigating factors and found them
insufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances, or
whether the difference between this Court's opinion and the
trial court's treatment of the petitioner's evidence is "purely
a matter of semantics," as suggested by the dissent.
Woodson and Lockett require us to remove any legitimate
basis for finding ambiguity concerning the factors actually
considered by the trial court.
THE CHIEF JusTICE may be correct in concluding that the
Court's opinion reflects a decision by some Justices that they
would not have imposed the death penalty in this case had
they sat as the trial judge. See ante, at 10-12. I, however,
do not read the Court's opinion either as altering this Court's
opinions establishing the constitutionality of the death penalty or as deciding the issue of whether the Constitution permits imposition of the death penalty on an individual who
committed a murder at age 16. Rather, by listing in detail
some of the circumstances surrounding the petitioner's life,
the Court has sought to emphasize the variety of mitigating
information that may not have been considered by the trial
court in deciding whether to impose the death penalty or
some lesser sentence.

/
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This is a capital case, here on certiorari to the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.
When Eddings was 16 years old ~he shot and killed~
a state highway patrol officer.

At the time,/~ddings -with

three younger juveniles - was running away from their
Missouri homes.

He had a history of emotional problems / had

been raised in a difficult family

situation~and

there was

testimony/ that his mental and emotional development; 'ere at
a

level/~eve~l

years below/ his chronological age.
;"""~

The Oklahoma capital punishment statute provides,

J

I

in the sentencing proceeding,/ that evidence may be presented
as to mitigating/ and aggr ~~ting circumstances.
Eddings'

circumstance,~but

~

was considered as a mitigating

this was viewed as outweighed by

i!ggra ating circumstances - primarily the deliberate
shooting of a state officer; 'ithout provocation other than
the fact / that Eddings had been stopped on a state highway
for erratic driving.

2.

Al ·:.......,.. mgh the trial court admit
Eddings' family

history~and emot~onal

d evidence)as to

instability, j it

declined to considered these / as mitigating circumstances.
The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed ;land the sentence of
death was affirmed.
In Lockett v. Ohio we held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require - in a capital case - that the
sentencing

authority~~t

be precluded from

considering ~ as

a

mitigating factor yi~Y aspe~~ of a defendant's character or
record.
We think the Oklahoma courts committed
failing to consider Eddings'

erro~in

backgroun~in mitigation.

We

therefore reverse the judgment insofar as it imposed the
death penalty,/ and remand the case for further proceedings.

I~a~a.tiRhis

Court is

~t ~awareJ'of

the extent

to which minors;lengage increasingly in violent crime.

Nor

do we suggest an absence of legal responsibility/ where crime
is committed by a minor.

We are concerned in

thi~as~nly

with the validity of the procedur, ;by which the death

_, /

... ~

penalty was imposed on an emotionally disturbe r l6 year old.
Justices Brennan and
opinions.

~

O'Connor ~ f1led

concurring

The Chief Justice has filed a dissenting opinion

in which Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist join.

,ju;rrtntt (!Jcurt ttf tlrt ~tb .;itatts

._a\T4ingtcn, ~. OJ. 2llgt~~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , ..JR .

January 20, 1982

Memorandum to the Conference
There are three cases being held for the decision
in 80-5727, Eddings v. Oklahoma:
Legare v. Zant----80-6725

Cert. to Georgia SC

This case is here after the Georgia courts denied
petitioner's effort to gain post-conviction relief.
Petitioner argues that the jury was prevented from
considering his youth as a mitigating factor. Petitioner
was 17 years of age at the time of the killing. The
prosecutor, on voir dire, asked nearly ever prospective
juror whether the defendant's youth would have any effect on
the juror's consideration of the death penalty. According
to petitioner, the few prospective jurors who said that they
would consider the defendant's youth were struck by the
state. In closing argument, the prosecutor referred back to
his question on voir dire and urged the jury not to consider
the defendant's youth. He said:
"I asked each and every one of you that
if because of the age of the defendant in
this case, you would be more likely to vote
against the death penalty for him than you
would, say, a thirty year old man ••• I asked
each one of you and each one of you said no
"And you'll have the satisfaction of
knowing that you have, in a case where the
evidence demanded, not only justified, but
demanded the death penalty, if you
disconsider his age, disconsider all of those
things which you're not supposed to
consider •••
"Just remember the evidence • • • • Push
the age of the defendant out of your mind.
He may be seventeen years chronologically but
he's older than any of us in the ways of evil
••• "Pet. at 21.
Furthermore, during the defense counsel's closing
argument, the prosecutor objected to his statement to the
jury that "if you're going to take a seventeen year old boy
and electrocute him, now--where are you going to cut it off,

2.
are you going down to ten years, fourteen years, sixteen
years ••• " Reply at 5. The prosecutor objected on the
grounds that defense counsel was "perfectly well aware that
there's a law that sets minimum age on this matter." In
Georgia no one under the age of 13 may be excecuted. The
trial judge sustained the objection, saying:
"I think that {defense counsel's]
argument is an incorrect principle of law.
You have leeway to argue matters of common
knowledge, but if you are going to argue
them, I think it ought be correct. Ladies
and Gentlemen, you've heard the evidence.
It's up to you to determine what punishment
he is to receive. Do not let any common
denominator have any effect upon your
responsibility." Reply at 6.
Petitioner suggests that this instruction from the bench may
have been understood by the jury as a direction not to
consider the defendant's age in mitigation.
In considering petitioner's petition for habeas
corpus, the state superior court rejected petitioner's
argument that the jury had not been permitted to consider
the fact of his youth. The trial court instructed the jury
that it could consider "all the evidence received in court"
including "the facts and circumstances, if any, in
extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation of punishment which
may have been submitted to you." The court found that only
one prospective juror indicated that she would not be able
to impose the death penalty because of the defendant's age,
and she was not excused for cause. Finally, although
defense counsel made the argument, he did not introduce any
mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial.
For these reasons, the superior court rejected petitioner's
contention as without merit. The Supreme Court of Georgia
denied petitioner's application for a certificate of
probable cause to appeal. There has been no §2254 review.
I think that this case is sufficiently close to
the situation in Eddings, that the Court should remand the
matter in light of Eddin6s. There appears to be a
substantial likelihood t at the jury as constituted believed
that it could not consider the defendant's age or was free
simply to ignore this factor in mitigation.
I recommend
that the Court grant, vacate, and remand for further
consideration in light of Eddings.

3.

High v. Georgia----No. 80-6843

Cert to Georgia SC

This case is here on direct appeal from the
Georgia Supreme Court. Petitioner was 17, eleven months,
and 10 days old at the time of the crime. Following an
armed robbery of a service station, petr and several others
took the owner of the station and his 11 year old son--the
only witnesses to the robbery--to a secluded wooded area
where they shot both of them. The father survived his
wounds; the boy did not. On the way to the excecution
site, petr taunted the child, telling him he was going to
die.
Petitioner argues that it violates the eighth
amendment to execute a person under age 18. Unlike the
situation in Eddings, however, it does not appear from the
state court opinion or the papers attached to the cert
petition that petr ever tried to place~ mitigating
factors before the jury. The trial judge instructed the
jury to consider any relevant mitigating evidence, and petr
makes no argument that the lower courts denied him the
opportunity of presenting relevant mitigating evidence
concerning his youth or upbringing. The case does not
appear to bear any resemblance to Eddings, and I therefore
recommend denial.

4.

Roach v. South Carolina----No. 81-5628 Cert to
South Carolina SC
This case is here following rejection of
petitioner's effort to gain post-conviction relief in state
court. Petitioner participated in an extraordinarily savage
double murder of a 17 year old boy and a 14 year old girl.
Petitioner was 17 at the time of the murders. The trial
judge found that there were 6 mitigating factors including
the petitioner's "age or mentality" at the time of the
crime. Notwithstanding these factors in mitigation, the
judge found that the death penalty was appropriate in the
circumstances of the case. The sentence was affirmed on
direct appeal, and the state courts refused to disturb it in
post-conviction proceedings. There has been no §2254
review.
Although petitioner was 17 at the time of the
crime, there is no claim here that petitioner was deprived
of the opportunity of presenting factors in mitigation for
the sentencer's consideration as there was in Eddings. I
therefore recommend denial.

/..,. t.l.

L.F.P., Jr.
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High Court UpSets Death ,fenaltyfor B0y, ..l6,-in•StayinioFTroO,
~

'

j

•

, ''4.•1• ,

Special to The New York nmee

..

WASHINGTON, Jan. '19- The Supreme Court today overturned a sentence of death imposed by the state
courts in Oklahoma on a boy who was 16
years old when he . murdered , a state
trooper.
The 5-to-4 ruling sidestepped the underlying constitutional issue in the case:
whether the Eighth Amendment which
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, ever permits the execution of a
juvenile offender.
Instead, the Court, in a majority decis ion by Associate Justice Lewis F. Ppwell Jr., ruled that the Oklahoma courts
had erred in failing to take the young offender's disturbed emotional state and
deprived family background into account as mitigating factors in the decision to impose the death penalty. That
conclusion made it unnecessary for the
Court to decide the broader constitutional issue. As a result, the deciSion has
no immediate effect on the 16 other
Death Row inmates around the countrywho are under the age of 18.
But if the legal ruling was a narrow
one, it was potentially significant as an
indication of the Court's current lineup
on the capital punisluhent, issue.. .The

.

case was the first death penalty case to
reach the Court since Sandra Day O'Connor replaced Potter Stewart, who
wrote several of the Court's decisions invalidating deatl\ sentences. Justice O'Connor joined the majority today and
also wrote a separate concurring opinion.
I
Dispute on Jurisdictional Issue
The ruling sparked an unusually contentious debate between the majority
and the dissenters, led by Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, on a jurisdictional
issue that has ramifications for the
Courfbeyond the case at hand.
Lawyers for Monty Lee Eddings, the
defendant; had mounted a broad Eighth
Amendment attack on the application of
the death penalty to juveniles, and ,neither in the lower courts nor in their petition to the Supreme Court did they raise
the procedural issue that formed the
basis for the majority's opinion.
That lapse, Chief Justice Burger said
in a dissenting opinion, should have prevented the Court from ruling on that
issue. The Court should have upheld the
death sentence, the Chief Justice said.
The dissent was joined by Associate Justices Byron R. White, Harry A. Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist.
·

Addressing the dissent's complaint in the defense lawyers offered as r
a footnote, Justice Powell said ,thdt the . ing evidence not only their clier
fact that the issue had not .been explic- but his background as an abuse
itly raised should not prevent the Court 'and psychologically disturbed
from deciding it. "Our jurisdiction does cent: The youth was running aw~
not depend on citation to book , and home when he shot and killed a h
verse," he wrote.
patrolman who stopped the car
driving. I
Differences In Procedures
The trial judge took the youtl
Appellate courts as a rule decline to · into consideration but declined
decide issues that parties have riot sider the other evidence, a decisi
raised in the lower courts. But partieS was upheld by the Oklahoma C
before the Supreme Court often try to · Criminal Appeals.
bring such issues up, and t~e Justices do
'Not a Normal 16-Year-Old
not seem to apply a consistent pol!cy on , "We find that the limitations
the matter. The debate today seemed to
·
indicate that, at leaSt when capital pun- by these courts upon the mitigati
.
dence they would consider viola
ishment lS at .stake, a narrow majority ruleofLockett," JusticePowelh
of the Court believes it should not penalThe defendant, Justice Powe
lze defendants for omissions In the pre- was "not a normal 16-year-old ,·
sentation of their case. ·
,
l . been deprived of the care, COnCE
The majority ruling today, Eddings
.paternal attention that childr
Oklahoma, No. SG-5727, was based on a serve."
.
1978 Supreme Court decision, Lockett v.'- He concluded:· "All of this d4
Ohio. The Lockett decis~on held that in suggest an absence of responsibi
deciding whether to impoee a death sen- the crime of murder, deliberate]
tence a court must have before it,any mitted in this case. Rather, it is
evidence the defendant w1sbes · to that just as the chroriological aj
present on why the death penalty sboulcl minor is itseH a relevant mitigati
tor of great weight, so must •tht
not be imposed.
In arguing against the death peoalty, ground and mental and emotional
opment of a youthful defendant I
considered in sentencing.''
·
The case oow goes back to tht
boma courts for a new sentencil

v.

ceedlng.

.

In addition to JuStice O'Conn
sodate Justices William J. Brenii
'IbUrgood Marshall and John Pa
veos joined Justice Powell's m

oplnlon.
Chief Justice Burger, disputii

majority-'s conclusion that youth
tional disturbances merited spec!
sideration, said, "One might e~
surprised if a person capable of a
and Wlprovoked killing of a polic
cerdid not suffer from some sort
sooalitydisorder.'"
..
I

New York Times, Jan. 25 , 1982
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,; The Suprem~ c&ur{ co~nu~ itS ~~rnest, thus. "offi~e~ app~ached . on foot; stuck· ~ loaded shotgun
far unavailing search .for humane ways to mete put out the window and shot the officer dead. ·
capital punishment. Last week's decision in the case
Mr. Eddings did not contest his guilt, but.
of Eddings ~~ Oklahoma dramatized the imeven .pleaded for mercy because of his youth and turbulent '
progress, and perhaps the futility, of that quest. · ', .· · history of broken homes and domestic violence. The
1
·. Justice Sandra O'Connor provided the most en- . sentencing judge said he was not persuaded by the
couraging news. Her crucial fifth vote to overturn the argument of youth and a$]ded, "Nor can the court in
death senferice of a murderer who was l6 at the time· following the law, in my opinion, consider the fact of
·of his crim~ placed her firmly with the Court's mod- this young man's violent background."
.e:t:ate, controlling center .. ....: • • : 1. ·
\
But the high court had said that in capital cases, ·
..~ Unwilling to rule out capital punishment in all · juStice demands that every mitigating factor be at ,
circumstances, Justice O'Connor ·nevertheless· least considered. Justice Lewis Powell,, writing for ·
agreedwithherpredecessor, POtter Stewart, that the , the majority, called for another sentencing hearing '
death penalty is "qualitatively different" from , at which the judge must consider that history, even if
prison sentences. Her concUrring opinion endo~ he finally deems it outweighed by other factors and
"eXtraordinary measures" to guard against execu- comes up with the same penalty. ·
.
I
. tions"outofwhim,passion,prejudice,ormistake." · ·
In dissent, Chief Justice Warren Burger found
·, .. But~ the '(ote was close: four dissenters would the record "at best ambiguous" as to whether the
still resolve ambiguities in favor of execution. That's sentencing judge had ignored or merely discounted
a precarious margin when the difference is so great.
the youth's history. The majority thought the matter

:;gt7~'·:.~:·' ~:.:~. ·.. _' -~ - -- .. ~-· ~

.

'r , No Justice condoned · 'Monty Lee Eddings's

cri!Jle. RUnning away from his Missouri home with a
gi:oup of younger companions, he took his brother's
car and his father's shotgun and rifles and drove to
Oklahoma, where he momentarily lost control of the
car on a turnpike. When his passengers. warned that
a highway patrol car was nearby, he boasted that if
the officer tried io "stop him he would "blow him
away."
He obeyed
an order
to... pull over and, as
the_
.
.
.
. .
r·~
. . ,.s-• • -.... .,:t j;.., v.'Z t_-~ _ ·
....... ~ }·. .
~

4

g~~~ ~:~~;thS:td"~U:t~:Yo~~~~~;;::~?~th~
much at stake.
'
On such fine points and close reasoning pivot
large issues of justice and humanity. The Sqpreme
Court undergoes this painful process because most of
its members appreciate that death is different. The
very care these cases now require suggests that the
Court may have to judge every one ..Would it not be
better to strike down all death penalties than struggle for such fine distinctions? '
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